I'd like to garner consensus on whether anyone else thinks it desirable to
have a flag option for bitcoin to punish blocks for not including
transactions. I notice there are already pro-miner options, such as the
restricting the relaying of free transactions, and so including an option
to restrict
I disagree with a bunch of your points, but I'll wait on others to comment,
except I will say that I don't understand what the 20 byte keyhash is. Can
you elucidate?
I am assuming major mining folks have written their own coinbasing
facilities, but perhaps this is not the case -- if so, I agree th
I see. That is undeniably more secure and "bitcoin-y" than my suggestion.
It's also really a lot more work, especially in that it requires extra
linkages between codebases that in my mind are largely separate.
I'm just one voice, but I persist in believing that the 'lighter' solution,
especially
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:36:34 PM Peter Vessenes wrote:
> I suppose I mean that I don't understand how to reverse that into a URL
> when one is presented only with a block, or perhaps a coinbase in a
> transaction.
A new message can be added to the p2p relay network, similar to tx and alert
bro
I suppose I mean that I don't understand how to reverse that into a URL
when one is presented only with a block, or perhaps a coinbase in a
transaction.
Best,
Peter
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 11:34 AM, Luke-Jr wrote:
> On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:28:56 PM Peter Vessenes wrote:
> > I don't understa
OK, I have a few thoughts on this:
1) Germane to the original conversation, anything hard to implement will
not get implemented by miners.
2) Coinbase is hard-limited to 100 bytes; this has to include space for
voting as well as extra nonce, etc. So, I'm not sure that a full URL is a
good plan.
3)
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:28:56 PM Peter Vessenes wrote:
> I don't understand what the 20 byte keyhash is. Can you elucidate?
20 byte keyhashes are a fundamental building block of the Bitcoin protocol.
ripemd160(sha256(ecdsaPubKey))
--
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 12:33 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> There appears to be some non-trivial mining power devoted to mining
> empty blocks.
In the last 2016 blocks, as I write this, there are only 35 1 txn blocks.
This is about 1.73%, which wouldn't be surprising just from timing
alone. Moreover
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 3:05:18 PM Peter Vessenes wrote:
> 1) Germane to the original conversation, anything hard to implement will
> not get implemented by miners.
Without my got-tired-of-waiting-for-someone-to-merge-it coinbaser branch,
anything modifying the coinbase is hard to implement.
>
On Tuesday, May 29, 2012 8:52:49 AM Michael Grønager wrote:
> The format of the sla.php page should then be specified too - but it could
> be a json-rpc call returning a json object like (as result): {
> sla_version: "0.1",
> accept_no_fee_tx: false,
> min_fee: 5,
> big_tx_fee:
Peter, I like the idea of being able to know what fees to expect from different
miners (it is like a service description / SLA for their service), but I would
prefer a more distributed discovery mechanism for the information on the fees
(Spent 10 years on Grid Computing...).
Miners could e.g. i
One of the issues here though is that it would be nice if miners published
their own tx rules -- it might be hard to impute them from data.
I had started a thread about this on bitcoin.org some time ago, and I don't
recall what the general outcome was.
I had imagined an open service whereby a min
Zooko is spot on - slower confirmations will give people a reason to set
higher fees. As soon as fees reach a level where they matter, even
botnet operators will be looking into ways of including transactions for
some extra profit.
In the meantime slightly slower confirmations aren't a problem. Co
For what it is worth, I question whether this is a problem. Or, I
guess I question whether the best solution to it isn't for people to
start including more transaction fees. In fact, I'm not entirely sure
that this problem doesn't actually *encourage* people to that
solution, which would be very go
We just implemented our own mining tool, soup-to-nuts, and I would say that
the likely motivation for what I presume are botnet owners is just economic.
It's a lot more work to make sure your merkleing and keeping up-to-date are
happening than it is to just get an 80 byte header from a central ser
I like the concept except that it only works if every node connected to the
miner enforces the rule (if it works). Once any one of the nodes forwards
the block, other nodes see it coming from a node that can pass the
challenge.
I don't think any solution based on node queries will succeed, espe
How about a simple proof of work test? This one though does not ask for CPU
work but asks the miner for a random old transaction. If the miner really
stores the entire blockchain he will not have any problem answering to that
getdata request, whereas a botnet would have to ask someone else for it,
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 8:57 PM, Luke-Jr wrote:
> Block times are not accurate enough for that.
The times in your log are very accurate, assuming your system clock is
remotely accurate.
--
Jeff Garzik
exMULTI, Inc.
jgar...@exmulti.com
---
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 8:51 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> which ones are the lazy miners (> 120 seconds since last block).
It's important to understand the motivations before acting— otherwise
you'll fail to do anything useful.
E.g. if they're empty because some miners want to drive up fees or
fight
On Friday, May 25, 2012 12:51:09 AM Jeff Garzik wrote:
> On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 8:45 PM, Luke-Jr wrote:
> > On Thursday, May 24, 2012 4:33:12 PM Jeff Garzik wrote:
> >> Comments? It wouldn't be a problem if these no-TX blocks were not
> >> already getting frequent (1 in 20).
> >
> > FWIW, based
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 8:45 PM, Luke-Jr wrote:
> On Thursday, May 24, 2012 4:33:12 PM Jeff Garzik wrote:
>> Comments? It wouldn't be a problem if these no-TX blocks were not
>> already getting frequent (1 in 20).
>
> FWIW, based on statistics for Eligius's past 100 blocks, it seems 10% (1 in
> 1
On Thursday, May 24, 2012 4:33:12 PM Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Comments? It wouldn't be a problem if these no-TX blocks were not
> already getting frequent (1 in 20).
FWIW, based on statistics for Eligius's past 100 blocks, it seems 10% (1 in
10) of 1-txn blocks is not actually unreasonable. This als
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Luke-Jr wrote:
> These are problematic for legitimate miners:
> 1) The freedom to reject transactions based on fees or spam filters, is
> severely restricted. As mentioned in other replies, this is an important point
> of Bitcoin's design.
> 1b) This punishes miner
On Thursday, May 24, 2012 4:33:12 PM Jeff Garzik wrote:
> There appears to be some non-trivial mining power devoted to mining
> empty blocks. Even with satoshi's key observation -- hash a fixed
> 80-byte header, not the entire block -- some miners still find it
> easier to mine empty blocks, rathe
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 1:27 PM, Robert McKay wrote:
> If miners wanted to continue mining empty blocks without bothering to
> monitor the Tx pool they would just switch to stuffing the empty blocks
> with a dummy transaction of their own to get round your new rules.
Yes. This was stated in the
On Thu, 24 May 2012 12:33:12 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> There appears to be some non-trivial mining power devoted to mining
> empty blocks. Even with satoshi's key observation -- hash a fixed
> 80-byte header, not the entire block -- some miners still find it
> easier to mine empty blocks, rather
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 1:13 PM, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen
wrote:
> optimization that avoids rechecking transactions that have already been
> verified as valid. Any transactions it doesn't have to verify are from the
> pool, of course :)
Work in this area is already progressing, though it is outsid
I think the strong verification would go well if you add it along with an
optimization that avoids rechecking transactions that have already been
verified as valid. Any transactions it doesn't have to verify are from the
pool, of course :)
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 7:33 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Th
I think you need the stronger change. Otherwise, the mystery miner could
just put in a few transactions to himself to mask his block. His block
would appear to be of some use while not being helpful.
-Arthur
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 9:33 AM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> There appears to be some non-tr
There appears to be some non-trivial mining power devoted to mining
empty blocks. Even with satoshi's key observation -- hash a fixed
80-byte header, not the entire block -- some miners still find it
easier to mine empty blocks, rather than watch the network for new
transactions.
Therefore I was
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