An unfinished response to a fairly old post. ----- Original Message ----- From: "John D. Giorgis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Killer Bs Discussion" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, June 14, 2003 9:29 AM Subject: Steven Miller Re: Question for Gautam, with possible thread following
> Isn't there something a little underhanded about asking somebody their > opinion of somebody, and then posting an absolutely ridiculous comment >from that somebody? I mean, I am sure that Mr. Miller is a brilliant man, >but the below comments seem absolutely asinine..... No, because Gautam has respectfully and strongly disagreed with folks that "he worships the ground they walk on." The only thing that the statement proves is that a reasonable person has these worries. I can go back and quote posts indicating that he does disagree with people for which he has the greatest respect, but I certainly don't think that's needed. In short, it would be very boring discussing the opinion of someone that Gautam thinks is an idiot with him; while it would be worthwhile discussing an opinion he respectfully disagrees with. > >http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0613/p02s02-woap.html > > > >And quotes: > > > >"We may look back and see that a nuclear-armed North Korea was the price of > >the Iraq war," > >O.k., this is mind-bogglingly stupid, since the DPRK already *had* >nuclear weapons before the Iraq war began. Out of curiosity, how can we know more than they have the capacity for a nuclear bomb and the fuel for a nuclear bomb....without them setting off a test? I think we can know that they have the tools to do so, but that's about it. But, even if one grants that they could very well have 1-2 bombs, they have crossed the red line into being able to produce 6 more per year. If they start the new reactor, it could go to 50/year. Odds are that are strong that they could sell some of those. >In fact, those weapons were assembled under Clinton's watch. How come Mr. Miller doesn't >say that "We may look back and see that a nuclear-armed DPRK in the long term was the >price of Clinton's insistence upon negotiations with a fundamentally untrustworthy > regime?" Two reasons. First of all, he agrees with Bush and Clinton, and appears to disagree** with you, that the US should not present a second Korean War as a fait accompli to the South Koreans over their strong objections. There were three choices in '94. 1) Cut a deal to freeze the processing of fuel rods. AFAIK, it was known at the time that the processing had already started, so the deal was made knowing that it was quite possible that North Korea already had enough plutonium for 1-2 bombs. 2) Bomb the nuclear plant to try to stop the program. This would probably have started a second Korean war. I've seen casualty estimates range from a rock bottom 100,000 killed, to 1 million in total casualties. Even assuming a far superior US military, I cannot see how the US could have prevented North Korea from causing a lot of damage before they destroyed their army. I do think we could stop them from taking Seoul and holding it hostage, but not from bombarding it. 3) Bluster and watch as North Korea does what it will. In hindsight, time was not as much on the side of the West as hoped. North Korea didn't fall quickly (<2 years): partly because the West could not watch millions of North Koreans die from starvation. > Moreover, unless Mr. Miller has somehow developed the Sure-Fire Plan to > Dismantle the DPRK's Nuclear Program (TM) that has eluded just about >every other thinking person that has tried to deal with the DPRK problem, then >it is ludicrous to argue that the Iraq War was somehow a trade-off for the > DPRK's nuclear program. Its not enough to conclude that ignoring a difficult and touchy situation for several critical months is a very bad thing? Using Gautam's "burning desk" description of foreign affairs, and alluding to a consensus that the diversion of focus caused by the war in Iraq would provide a window of opportunity for North Korea to cross the red line, it is not unreasonable to comment that the fact that this happened might very well be connected to the lack of focus. > The Iraq War can only be a "price" if there was an alternative, and I >have seen not one observer of the situation propose a serious alternative for > using the resources expended in the Iraq war to dismantle the DPRK's > nuclear program. Not resources, so much as focus. So, if Mr. Miller has a Sure-Fire Plan to Dismantle the > DPRK's Nuclear Program (TM), I'm sure that President Bush would love to see > it. > > >"The real issue is what the Chinese will be willing to do to coerce North > >Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions," says Harvard's Dr. Miller. "The > >Chinese have not been willing to do Washington's dirty work, > > This is the sort of partisan side-swipe I'd expect from Paul Krugman, not > from a serious analyst. How on Earth is disarming the DPRK's nuclear > program, "Washington's dirty work?" Its dirty because it involves doing things like cutting off food and power to a desperately poor nation. It also involves risks for the PRC. One of them would be the messy necessity of dealing will millions of refugees. They'd have to deal with negative consequences from the collapse of North Korea directly; we'd only have to deal with it indirectly. In short, China has negative consequences for some outcomes that have positive consequences for the US, as well as high potential costs for implementing policies that the US suggests. In particular, the fall of the present government would be close to an unmixed blessing for the US, a mixed blessing for South Korea, and mostly negative for China. >Moreover, why are the ROK, Japan, the PRC, and the Russian Federation >absolved from responsibility for securing peace in this corner of the world - their own >corner of the world? There are a couple of points on this: 1) We should expect countries to seek their own self interest. So, I'd be shocked if the Russian or Chinese government worked for outcomes that they would suffer for more than gain from. Thus, it is reasonable to expect them to have unmitigated support for the US position. Further, it is very reasonable for the South Korean government to take a much dimmer view of 100k+ dead South Koreans than the US government. I'm not arguing that the US government would be sanguine about our allies dying, but I think that it is not unreasonable to think that we'd worry more about 100k dead in NYC than Seoul. 2) We should expect honest differences in interpreting events and be respectful of allies we disagree with. I don't see the advantage of humiliating allies because we differ with them. South Korea is not France. >> and frankly > >why should they be? They don't want a nuclear-armed Pyongyang any more than > >Washington does," he adds, "but other than that, their concerns are > >different. They don't want a collapsing regime on their border that would > >send waves of desperate refugees" into China. > > So, given that: -The cooperation of the PRC is absolutely essential to >applying the pressure to the DPRK needed to get it to disarm. > -The DPRK has a history of taking our bribes and building nuclear > weapons anyways. > -A major concern for the PRC is to prevent a collapse of the DPRK > regime, resulting in an influx of refugees into Northern China. > > Isn't the logical response of the United States to convince the PRC that we > are willing to precipitate exactly such a refugee crisis if the PRC does > not cooperate with us? Actually, he is suggesting that they precipitate such a crisis in order to help us out. That is one feared outcome of a embargo of North Korea. The North Koreans starve to death, and desperately mass on the border with China. The second feared outcome (from the Chinese perspective) is that the North Korean government will be replaced with a government that is hostile to China. An example of this would be a reunified Korea under a democratically elected government. >And isn't this part of what Bush is doing? In a word, no. He appears to believe that standing tough will always win the day. By talking about regime change, and the axis of evil he has given at least an indication that he is interested in taking steps to overthrow the North Korean government even if they more or less keep their word on nuclear arms. That is clearly contrary to the Chinese self interest. They do not want a US ally on their border. A North Korea with a significant nuclear arsenal is also not in the best interest of China. What would be in their best interest is for North Korea to follow the China reformed Communism model. That would actually give the US what it needed; especially if it was agreed that North Korea could totally drop its nuclear program while improving its security. Its not an ideal solution, but its one that all parties can live with. That was the hope in '94. Dan M. ** I use the words "appear to" on purpose. That's the understanding I have from earlier posts, but I'm willing to accept clarification and correction on this point. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
