On Tue, Jan 18, 2000 at 02:44:38PM -0800, The Tree of Life wrote:
When I talked to another person to ask if he had 'acquired' the source, he
said he wasn't going to give it out. I asked him if he had a patch for it,
and he replied "the fbsd team is working on it. No patch is available right
If I remember correctly, this may something to do with the "transparency"
designed into FW-1: if a problem occurs and the inspect module is reloaded,
state tables purged etc., this should not break the connections underway. So if
an ACK goes back, the firewall gets it through, the sending host is
Hi everyone,
Microimages has one nice X server for Windows, which allow you to wun
Windows 95/98 and to work Graphicaly with some *NIX based system, for
example I have SunOS and I export my DISPLAY to my host where I'm running
Windows95/98 with MIX server, and all I run on my Sun will be
The following is a Security Bulletin from the Microsoft Product Security
Notification Service.
Please do not reply to this message, as it was sent from an unattended
mailbox.
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-002)
In some mail from Ofir Arkin, sie said:
I will try to focus more on the subject.
FW-1 do accept: ACK, SYN-ACK, NULL, FIN-ACK (and more) as valid
traffic if they match the rule base, even if no connection establishment
was in progress and no session state was in the firewalls table.
[...]
A couple of comments in a couple different directions...
Eric states that there will be implementation issues.
To be nastier about it, if the browser vendors can't shut off
Javascript when I hit the checkbox, why think they could
do it by following an HTML directive?
And to pre-hack the idea..
Blindly trusting an outside source to update virus pattern/definition/dat
files (or any other app) throughout your enterprise is foolish.
Corporations should have a mechanism to test new updates before they are
released to the general server/user population. This is a simple way to
minimise
-Original Message-
From: Frank Monroe [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2000 1:01 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Security Vulnerability with SMS 2.0 Remote Control
I noticed the problem that I explain below when SMS 2.0 was released. I
didn't see this
There are two vulnerabilities in FW-1. The first is an authentication
issue, the other is a configuration issue. Since I don't have a copy
of 4.x FW-1 handy maybe someone can check it for me.
#1
The basic authentication used in Checkpoint FW-1 used for
inside/outbound and outside/inbound
Well, about iplogging the fact is not that some iplogger can miss
this specific sub-Xmas scans. The ''bug'' (if we can call it as a bug)
it's at the base idea of many iploggers used nowadays is based on a
concept:
By default all packets passes
Strange packets are logged.
That's not the best,
what auth schemes are you using? if you've already used basic auth and
the .ida stuff is in the same realm as the previous basic auth realm
then you won't get prompted until you either (a) switch realms or (b)
use another auth scheme.
Cheers, Michael Howard
Windows 2000 Security
Got an 'Access
- -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
We at High Speed Hosting consider the post by one Brian Mueller, to
BUGTRAQ , at best to be irresponsible and at worst , downright
dangerous to our network and the thousands of business clients
connected to it .
Since we use bugtraq regularly , and
In some mail from The Tree of Life, sie said:
I've been informed today by an irc admin that a new exploit is circulating
around. It "sends tcp-established bitstream shit" and makes the "kernel
fuck up".
It's called stream.c.
The efnet ircadmin told me servers on Exodus (Exodus
At 11:25 AM 1/21/2000, Tim Yardley wrote:
stream.c issues
---
:: temp remedy (exec summary)
---
If you use ipfilter...
-- start rule set --
block in quick proto tcp from any to any head 100
pass in
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