I forwarded the Magic Byte message thread to Trend Micro and this was their
response... they want me and my clients to upgrade to their latest version
in order to get realistic protection... Anyone from Trend Micro listening?
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTE
<
uplod phpshell in PHP Advanced Transfer Manager
one save as the code :
file > save as > sQl.php.ns
now upload in the PHP Advanced Transfer Manager
end the upload go to >
www.site.com/[file upload name]/[files]/sQl.php.ns?sQl=[command linux]
search google :
PHP Adv
/*
*
* Mirabilis ICQ 2003a Buffer Overflow Download Shellcoded Exploit
* Bug discovered & exploit coded by ATmaCA
* Web: http://www.spyinstructors.com && http://www.atmacasoft.com
* E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
* Credit to Kozan and delicon
*
*/
/*
* Usage:
*
* Execute exploit, it will create "bof.
1. The bug is over a year old (see bid 10760).
2. The bug was fixed in 1.1.5, so that version is not vulnerable.
3. It was discovered by Radek Hulan, not "RoDheDoR".
4. The exploit detailed is copied directly from the old bid so "RoDheDoR" was
obviously aware of it.
The nerve of some of these rep
The MG2 Image Gallery system has the ability to make create online galleries.
Even password protected once.
By manipulating url from a gallery, you are able to list out all pictures in
every gallery. Even though they are inside a password protected folder.
Sample manipulation could be:
www.your
Hello Mark,
> vulnerability is limited in our products to one specific type of potential
> virus file
It is .bat files (if I remember).
>which is not commonly allowed in most IT systems
Yes, I think organizations must implement good e-mail policy that blocks all
executable file types (or allow so
> > Multiple Vendor Anti-Virus Software Detection Evasion Vulnerability
through
> > forged magic byte.
>
> > AUTHOR: Andrey Bayora (www.securityelf.org)
>
> > For more details, screenshots and examples please read my article "The
Magic
> > of magic byte" at www.securityelf.org . In addition, yo
Quoting Steve Shockley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
That's it. NOT ONE WORD ABOUT A VULNERABILITY OR A FIX.
In NetApp's defense, they did send out an advisory to customers five
hours after
the initial notice of the availability of the fix. I understand only
customers
who have licensed the iSCSI c
> Consequently, the issue that you describe is *not* a
> vulnerability issue, but rather just an example of a new variant
> that has not yet been added to an AV vendor's database of "known
> viruses".
>
yap, maybe* but i consider this issue equv. to the 'classic issue' of
adding NOP to the shell-c
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
### Vendor Response
Network Appliance Data ONTAP 7.0.2 is a General Availability release:
http://now.netapp.com/NOW/cgi-bin/software
Release of this advisory was coordinated with Network
Appliance. Network Appliance has confirmed this vulnerability. For
further infor
> Especially in case of EXEs, AFAIK not all EXEs has the same 'MAGIC BYTE'
> (MZ). MZ only appears in the first two bytes of Win32 executable files.
Just for the curiosity: if you'll change "MZ" to "ZM" then the 16-bit
executables (MZ and NE executables) will still run and 32-bit (PE) executables
Le jeudi 27 octobre 2005 à 08:54 -0500, Tatercrispies a écrit :
> And I really don't see how this could ever be used to execute
> server-side script unless for some bizarre reason you had your
> webserver so completely misconfigured as to be beyond imagination. Why
> would you be parsing image fil
On Thu, October 27, 2005 10:12 am, Florian Weimer said:
> Have you considered in your analysis that malicious servers might
> return HTTP redirects which contain suitable URLs? This requires that
> the offsiteok member is set to true, though, because in the version I
> looked at, only http:// URLs
On 10/27/05, Nicob <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le mardi 25 octobre 2005 à 17:02 -0400, Paul Laudanski a écrit :
> >
> > Anyone have other ideas on this? I've already implemented some code
> > to validate file input and its working. But is this the right
> > approach?
>
> I'm not sure to understa
* Bernhard Mueller:
> While the vulnerability can not be exploited using the Snoopy class
> file itself, there may exist implementations which hand unchecked
> URLs from users to snoopy.
Thanks for the notice.
Have you considered in your analysis that malicious servers might
return HTTP redire
> Subject: Re: Multiple Vendor Anti-Virus Software Detection
> Evasion Vulnerability through forged magic byte
> From: "Andrey Bayora"
> Date: 2005-10-25 3:07:51
>
> [...]
>
> VULNERABLE vendors and software (tested):
>
> [...]
>
> 3. eTrust CA (ver 7.0.1.4, engine 11.9.1, vir sig. 9229)
>
> [.
On Tue, 25 Oct 2005, Tatercrispies wrote:
> On 10/25/05, Paul Laudanski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Anyone have other ideas on this? I've already implemented some code to
> > validate file input and its working. But is this the right approach?
> >
>
> Since it is an IE issue, you may a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [~]# mysql -uhorde -p -h example.com
pelese enter blank password
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 922208 to server version: 4.0.22-standard
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the buffer.
mysql> s
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Andrey Bayora
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes
Multiple Vendor Anti-Virus Software Detection Evasion Vulnerability through
forged magic byte.
Interesting
Have you considered the possibility that some vendors at least may
include with each virus signature a set of fil
Bob Beck wrote:
> Sit you your faviorite wireless network and MITM your faviorite ssl
>web sites off it. If your user population is very intelligent, maybe
>only 9 out of 10 will click the "Windows is annoying me with a box and
>an OK button - I will click OK to keep going" popup and ignore
>
> The "TLS, if available" option is common to most MUAs and is a serious
> security problem.
>
As is every other mainstream application of TLS/SSL I've ever seen
coded into a mainstream application. Don't just pick on Thunderbird
for it - applications using TLS/SSL typically make MITM
I checked the "ZM" variant and got the same results as for "MZ" one.
Thus, I think that they indeed, detected as executables, but only AV vendor
can tell for sure.
Generally, there are many variants for this issue, as many various "magic
byte" variants exist.
In my case - I force AV to look at the
Remote File Inclusion in :-
--
vCard
Date :-
--
26/10/2005
version :-
-
2.9
The bug reside in :-
---
define.inc.php
And error in :-
--
online.inc.php
search google :-
---
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