Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on

2009-11-04 Thread Gabor Gombas
On Wed, Nov 04, 2009 at 09:15:31PM +1100, p...@maths.usyd.edu.au wrote: > > Irrelevant. The statement was ... > > Sorry, you misunderstood, that was not the statement. Here is the statement I replied to: >> The link count of a files tells you the number of hard links that >> are persisted within

Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on

2009-11-04 Thread Gabor Gombas
On Wed, Nov 04, 2009 at 10:17:13AM +1100, p...@maths.usyd.edu.au wrote: > But, mount requires root (and root can do anything, including shooting > himself in the foot). Irrelevant. The statement was that if /proc is not mounted, then the link count tells if there are other ways to access the inod

Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on

2009-11-03 Thread Gabor Gombas
On Tue, Nov 03, 2009 at 12:33:28AM +0100, Martin Rex wrote: > > "mount --bind" behaves like a hard link and it does not increment the link > > count. > > that seems to work similar to a hardlink on a directory (and also requires > root privileges). It doesn't work for the same directory level, b

Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on

2009-11-03 Thread Gabor Gombas
On Mon, Nov 02, 2009 at 08:53:26PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > The link count of a files tells you the number of hard links that > > are persisted within the same filesystem. It is _NOT_ a promise > > that there are no other means to access the inode of the file. > > It used to be promise bef

Re: gcc 4.1 bug miscompiles pointer range checks, may place you at risk

2006-04-18 Thread Gabor Gombas
On Mon, Apr 17, 2006 at 10:03:54PM +0200, Felix von Leitner wrote: > static inline int range_ptrinbuf(const void* buf,unsigned long len,const > void* ptr) { > register const char* c=(const char*)buf; /* no pointer arithmetic on > void* */ > return (c && c+len>c && (const char*)ptr-c }