-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
MITKRB5-SA-2015-001
MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2015-001
Original release: 2015-02-03
Last update: 2015-02-03
Topic: Vulnerabilities in kadmind, libgssrpc, gss_process_context_token
VU#540092
CVE-2014-5352: gss_process_context_token() incorrectly fre
-Original Message-
From: Abe Getchell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, 18 July 2008 12:39 PM
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: Windows Vista Power Management & Local Security Policy
> When the security option "Shutdown: Allow system to be shutdown without
having to log on" (
The script simply hides or shows the link on the page which points to
sf.
http://sourceforge.net/projects/injection-fwk/
-Original Message-
From: Nick Boyce [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 20, 2007 9:13 AM
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Cc: Guillermo Marro
Subject: Re: Yet a
*The MS07-012 patch that came out on Black Tuesday in Feb 2007 is not a
complete solution to the problem.*
Title: MFC42u.dll Off-by-Two Overflow
Date: 15 March 2007
Affected: Windows 2000, XP, 2003 (those that were affected by the MS07-012
patch)
Reported by: Greg Sinclair (gssincla
IE7 Beta 2 build [7.0.5346.5] parses without crashing.
Greg Merideth
Forward Technology, LLC.
CTO & Other Wild Stuff
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP Fingerprint
18C3CE191171736225D62C3829F7B18A00F2AC0C
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, Jun
Does this include the ACS appliance engine.
Greg Owens, CCNP CCSP CISSP
Email:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
Sent from my Samsung I730 Wireless Handheld
-Original Message-
>From: "Matthew Cerha"<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: 5/8/06 6:15:
got a the technical contact's address: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hope those help.
Greg R.
sheeponhigh wrote:
>hi, there
> you could try this feedback form.
>http://help.lycos.com/search/search_form.asp
>
>
>2006/2/2, Spiros Antonatos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>>Anyone knows
The only attack vector we know about for Win9x, ME platforms is through
printing. I'm afraid that "fixing" that would break some functionality.
Greg
This post is provided as is and confers no rights or whatever.
-Original Message-
From: Joe Polk [mailto:[
Yes, it had been known for a while. Searching for "style overflow
scroll" in bugzilla brings up a list of bug reports.
So, instead of posting to bugtraq you could have added a note to one of
those bug reports. Then again, posting here might put some pressure on
mozilla developers, who knows?
ters (number of IP addresses kept, keep-alive period) this
mitigation technique may become more resource intensive for the operator
than switching to TCP.
Bye
Greg
Gabber 0.8.7 leaks presence information without user authorization
Greg Troxel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
DESCRIPTION
Gabber 0.8.7 sends a presence message to the Jabber ID
[EMAIL PROTECTED] at login and logout time.
This is a privacy violation: that a user even exists
Product:Efficient Networks 5861 DSL Router
http://www.efficient.com/ebz/5800.html
Tested version: 5.3.80 (Latest firmware)
Advisory date: 10/01/2003
Severity: Moderate
Background
"Efficient Networks® Business Class IDSL, ADSL, or SDSL Routers
r to do?
We have here an exclusive or: Which is it - 1 or 2 or neither?
Thanks,
-Greg
===
Ford CIRT
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
===
-Original Message-
From: Paul Starzetz [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, August 26, 2002 10:47 AM
To: Andrey Kolishak; [EMAIL PROT
o your DNS
queries. It wouldn't take much to enhance your DNS cache (recursive
resolver) software with ACLs that dictate which answers you expect to
come from which source addresses. Megainfrastructure encompassing the
whole world is not required for that.
Bye
Greg
can be done there needs to be some kind of law put in
> place to protect the researchers who find the holes.
IANAL, but I would hope no new laws are necessary -- the recognition of
fair notice should be sufficient.
--
Greg A. Wood
) do not run Apache.
Greg
Just thought I'd bring that up.
se NIDS evasion techniques would be synonymous to me posting a
discovery that I can tunnel non-compliant app traffic through my stateful
packet filtering firewall with ease. Most veteran security practitioners
would probably respond with "No duh, Greg, use a proxy-based firewall if
you are conce
NLSRTL Version 3.4.0.0.0 - Production
SQL>
Not sure if ANSI syntax is required (not testable in 8.1.6) and I don't have
a 9i DB to test it on.
Greg.
> - Begin Forwarded Message -
> The point is that I can see the dba_users view owned by SYS as a user
> w
m/virus self-
propagation the author must implictly relinquish his or her right to
control redistribution, at least free redistribution, since nobody can
prove one way or another how some second analyst might have obtained a
copy of the code when all initial distribution is anonymous (and free).
--
irectly or indirectly authorised agents) to
analyze it and to publish the results of that analysis.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I guess it is possible for the attacker(s) to work
around this first-level defense though and ACK one or two data packets
first, but will they? :-)
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL P
to get around this.
sshd is also the only application that has this problem. telnet
and rlogin do not.
--Greg
e actually doing then you may not have
hidden it properly at all.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
iously there are many problems with this trick, but it
does avoid the need to make the LDA run as root. ;-)
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
t, but it can be
done. Of course a mail storage system such as Cyrus IMAP can facilitate
this much more readily, though it doesn't have to since it now has
built-in, user-controllable, presumably secure, filtering.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
d on any mail reader program. (There never was in the first
place, in so far as Solaris is concerned.)
Please don't make excuses for a broken system. Please fix it! Please
do your best to avoid potential new problems too, and don't just paper
over them -- learn from history!
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
:IMNX-2001-70-020-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
zenith parsec found numerous format string bugs in the version
of minicom that is included in all versions of Immunix OS
In my estimation the risk resulting from a successfull group-ID "mail"
compromise is still almost infinitely less than the risk of a root
compromise, regardless of what the system involved is used for!
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
he mail delivery agent and you can put your mailbox directory on a
separate filesystem such that you don't have to use FS quotas there.
BSD's setuid-root mail subsystem is stupidly insecure, but many of us
do live with its risks every day..... :-(
--
far back as SysIII (i.e. 1980) there's clear evidence that the
entire AT&T UNIX mail system was leaning far away from using root
privileges and would work entirely with just setgid.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP &l
:IMNX-2001-70-019-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
A temp file race has been found in the all release of samba prior to
2.0.9. This could allow any local malicious user
:IMNX-2001-70-018-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
A new version of GnuPG, 1.0.5, has been released that fixes a number
of bugs and security problems, including a
:IMNX-2001-70-017-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Richard Johnson has found a format string problem in the version of
gftp that ships with Immunix 6.2 and 7.0 (fo
On Fri, Apr 20, 2001 at 12:40:11PM +0300, Atro Tossavainen wrote:
> Hello Greg,
>
> > Precompiled binary packages for Immunix 6.2 are available at:
> >
>http://immunix.org/ImmunixOS/6.2/updates/RPMS/netscape-common-4.77-0.6.2_StackGuard.i386.rpm
>
> and so
:IMNX-2001-70-014-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Florian Wesch has found that Netscape versions prior to 4.77 are
vulnerable to a buffer overflow bug in the way Ne
:IMNX-2001-70-015-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Versions of pine that shipped with Immunix 6.2, 7.0-beta, and 7.0 are
vulnerable to temp file races which could
:IMNX-2001-70-013-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Przemyslaw Frasunek has found a buffer overflow in the ntpd package
(see http://www.securityfocus.com/arc
:IMNX-2001-70-012-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
RedHat has released updated kerberos packages that fixes a number of
logical and temp file problems (see
:IMNX-2001-70-011-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
An attacker could embed malicious VIM control codes into a file, and
as soon as any user opened that file in vim-enhan
:IMNX-2001-70-010-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
The 2.2.19 kernel release fixes numerous security problems including
the ptrace/execve race condition bug that was re
:IMNX-2001-70-009-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Solar Designer has posted an excellent analysis of problems in current
versions of numerous SSH protocol implement
:IMNX-2001-70-007-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
A buffer overflow in the slrn news reader has been reported by Bill
Nottingham. This buffer is created on the heap, so
:IMNX-2001-70-006-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
The version of mutt shipped in Immunix 6.2 has a format string
vulnerability. The version of mutt shipped in all I
:IMNX-2001-70-008-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Previous versions of the sgml-tools package would create temporary
files without any special permissions in th
-2001-70-005-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
The version of joe shipped in Immunix OS 6.2 and 7.0-beta looks for a
configuration file in the current working directory, the
:IMNX-2001-70-004-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
The version of sudo shipped in Immunix OS 7.0-beta and 7.0 contains a
buffer overflow of a variable that is on the heap
-2001-62-002-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
WireX was recently notified that three packages had not been updated
for which there had been security updates for in the pas
:IMNX-2001-70-003-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
RedHat has released an updated version of the vixie-cron packages
which fixes a number of buffer overflows that
On Sat, Feb 10, 2001 at 10:28:01AM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>
> The following trivial patch should fix this issue.
Here's the patch that Alan accepted and put into 2.2.18-pre9 to fix this
problem.
greg k-h
--
greg@(kroah|wirex).com
http://immunix.org/~greg
diff -Naur -X /home
On Thu, Feb 08, 2001 at 02:52:45PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
> Chris Evans has discovered a security problem in the kernel select()
This should have read "sysctl()". Sorry for any confusion.
greg k-h
--
greg@(kroah|wirex).com
http://immunix.org/~greg
PGP signature
:IMNX-2001-70-002-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
Chris Evans has discovered a security problem in the kernel select()
call that can lead to information leakage in the
e {
- - INSIST(dev->newsocket->address.type.sa.sa_family == sock->pf);
- - dev->newsocket->address.length = addrlen;
- - dev->newsocket->pf = sock->pf;
}
+
+ dev->newsocket->address.length = addrlen;
+ dev->newsocket-&
t=i386--netbsd --prefix=/usr/pkg --x-libraries=/usr/X11R6/lib
--x-includes=/usr/X11R6/include
OBJECT_FMT= ELF
LICENSE=
RESTRICTED=
NO_SRC_ON_FTP=
NO_SRC_ON_CDROM=
NO_BIN_ON_FTP=
NO_BIN_ON_CDROM=
CC= cc-egcs-1.1.2
_PKGTOOLS_VER=2829
--
Greg A
down, but I suspect others are doing / have
done that.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
-001-01
Replaces Advisory ID: IMNX-2000-62-044-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
**UPDATED PACKAGES**
Description:
The glibc packages that WireX released for Immunix 6.2 on January 19,
:IMNX-2001-70-001-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
The people at COVERT Labs have discovered a number of security
problems with all previous versions of Bind (see
-043-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
There is a bug in the current version of the GNU C Library (glibc)
that is shipped with Immunix Linux 6.2. This bug can allow
unpriv
-70-029-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
Description:
There is a bug in the current version of the GNU C Library (glibc)
that is shipped with Immunix Linux 7.0-beta. This bug can
Third time's the charm, right?
On Wed, Jan 10, 2001 at 02:04:42PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
> - there is no function called tempname(), I should have said
> tmpname().
It's either tmpnam() or tempnam().
I'll get this right someday :)
greg k-h
--
greg@(
Ok, three nice typos that I missed:
- all of the dates should say 2001, not 2000.
- it's 'affected' not 'effected'
- there is no function called tempname(), I should have said
tmpname().
Sorry about that,
greg k-h
--
greg@(kroah|wire
a version with the mkstemp
patch. We prefer to have multiple levels of security (like our patch to
inn shows.)
Hope this helps clear up things with regards to this package update.
greg k-h
--
greg@(kroah|wirex).com
http://immunix.org/~greg
---
Immunix OS Security Advisory Summary
Date: January 10, 2000
Advisory ID:IMNX-2000-70-028-01
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[EMAIL PROTEC
citly) to be
installed from source.
There are probably a couple of papers here for anyone with the time to
do some deeper research and write them up! :-)
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix,
e accounted for is of
course critical with any "one-time password" scheme. Unfortunately
people will still use shared accounts (eg. root!) making such auditing
very difficult and almost never done.
I personally will never use s/key again.
--
ut hopefully generic, user-level interface tool.
--
Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Planix, Inc. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Secrets of the Weird <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
he process and forget cleanly
> exiting the application.
Perhaps sending the 'quit' event first and then killing those that don't
quit in a certain period of time.
Greg
Greg FrancisGonzaga University
Unix System Administrator Spokane Washington
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 509-323-6896
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