Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-21 Thread Randy Bush
ip verify unicast reverse-path This command drops traffic from an interface if that interface is not the route back to the address. ^ preferred best and therein lies the rub randy

Re: rp_filter? (was Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation)

2000-02-21 Thread Chuck Phillips
Linux already has such an option; just go for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do echo 1 $f done and the routing logic will drop packets with forged source addrs. It's not on by default. Yet. Julien Nadeau writes: I must be

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-18 Thread Elias Levy
I am summarizing a number of responses on this thread. Unicast Revert Path Forwarding (RPF). ip verify unicast reverse-path This command drops traffic from an interface if that interface is not the route back to the address. This in effect drops spoofed address. It requires that Cisco Express

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Chris Cappuccio
This is a complete lie. All modern "terminal servers" (you know, integrated modems and dialup server hardware) including the Cisco As5300 that you mention are fully capable of filtering traffic based on source address with no real impact on performance. There is absolutely no excuse for an ISP

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Andreas Busse
Hello all, On Tue, 15 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: It's good to see that ISP's around the world prefer to have $$ in the bank rather than a secure Internet. Little wonder that hacking is so prevalent. I'd like to add that we (as a rather small german ISP) filter source addresses too, at

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread John Edwards
Alan Brown wrote: On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". To be fair, if you do this on most terminal servers (eg, Cisco

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Darren Reed
In some mail from Hugh LaMaster, sie said: [...] The simplest ingress filtering to stop IP address spoofing on a Cisco is simply to apply the following to stub network interfaces: ip verify unicast reverse-path I assume that this is mostly what people are talking about in

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Ryan Russell
On Tue, 15 Feb 2000, Alan Brown wrote: On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". To be fair, if you do this on most

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Stainforth, Matthew
] Subject: Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation Ingress/egress filters can be problematic, its not just a performance problem. With upstream providers being real harsh on handing out IP ranges, and insisting that every IP subnet be used regardless of how many criss cross routes we have to put

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-17 Thread Carson Gaspar
"Alan" == Alan Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Alan On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". Alan To be fair, if you do this

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-16 Thread Bennett Todd
2000-02-14-13:44:09 Julien Nadeau: A solution would be for kernels to provide an option to keep a local IP lookup table which could be simply based on network interfaces; of course, given an stable implementation, this option enabled by default would take care of spoofing problems for admins

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-15 Thread Darren Reed
In some mail from Andrzej Bialecki, sie said: On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: In some mail from Elias Levy, sie said: [...] Network Ingress Filtering: -- All network access providers should implement network ingress filtering to stop any of

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-15 Thread Darren Reed
In some mail from Alan Brown, sie said: On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote: You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". To be fair, if you do this on most

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-15 Thread Julien Nadeau
You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". They've had the ability to do it for years and in doing so would seriously reduce the number and possibility of "spoofing"

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-15 Thread Homer Wilson Smith
Ingress/egress filters can be problematic, its not just a performance problem. With upstream providers being real harsh on handing out IP ranges, and insisting that every IP subnet be used regardless of how many criss cross routes we have to put in our many routers to do it, the access lists

Re: DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-15 Thread John Payne
On Sun, Feb 13, 2000 at 07:50:17PM +1100, Darren Reed wrote: You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this, I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this due to "performance reasons". They've had the ability to do it for years and in doing so would

DDOS Attack Mitigation

2000-02-11 Thread Elias Levy
Unless you lived under a rock for the past week you've heard of the distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) against some of the top Internet web sites. In particular these attacks were of the bandwidth consumption type. Some of the network providers involved claim to have been upwards of 1