Re: PIX DMZ Denial of Service - TCP Resets

2000-03-27 Thread Guido van Rooij
On Wed, Mar 22, 2000 at 02:25:16AM +1100, Darren Reed wrote: The general gist of this problem is poorly implemented TCP connection state tracking. You *must* track window sizes and sequence numbers and acknowledgments to at least reduce the chance of any given TCP packet from "outside"

Re: PIX DMZ Denial of Service - TCP Resets

2000-03-22 Thread Andrew Alston
Recieved from Darren Reed: There have been many different ways in which it has been possible to exercise this particular target, over the years. The general problem here is that the PIX doesn't really provide connection security like it should and if FW-1 is vulnerable to the same problem, then

Re: PIX DMZ Denial of Service - TCP Resets

2000-03-21 Thread Darren Reed
In some mail from Andrew Alston, sie said: [...] On recieving a RST packet (TCP Reset) from a given host with the correct source and destination port, the PIX will drop the state entry for that particular connection, which means the tcp connection dies due to the fact that no state entry the

PIX DMZ Denial of Service - TCP Resets

2000-03-20 Thread Andrew Alston
A brief rundown of the problem. If you run routable ips on your internal interface on your pix, and routeable ips on your external interface, so the pix is not running nat, the pix keeps a state table of everything going on. Anything that is not in your state table that attempts to come in from