--[SNIP]
yes so a random key K is used to encrypt all the data on the volume; the
passphrase is used to encrypt the key K. This design allows to change the
passphrase without reencrypting the whole drive (only K needs to be
reencrypted).
--[/snip]---
the o
Firstly, we appricate truecrypt team comments but on the other hand we do not
agree on some.
--Adonis Comment--
I do not agree with some of truecrypt comments specially the quoted text below.
What if you had created a virtual disk and give that to someone. That someone
use it as his/her o
We appreciate your comments,
Did you check truecrypt video ?
http://www.safehack.com/Advisory/truecrypt/truecrypt.html
We are not saying maybe it is documented feature. We did not see that and the
objective was not to test truecrypt but it was to test pgp. It was a trial on
truecrypt and we re
On Wed, 24 May 2006 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Steps to access PGP Encrypted Disk (Passphrase) using a Backdoor type attack
> [...]
> * Now say you give that disk to someone and they changed the
> passphrase on it. You can still access it
Intuitively, the system works as follows: a rando
Dear [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Sorry, but I see no security vulnerability here.
Disk encryption usually works this way:
1. Disk is divided to blocks (or files). Each block is encrypted with
random symmetric key to extend security and encryption/description
speed.
2. Block key is encrypted
Hello,
This is an official response from the TrueCrypt development team.
First, this is not a security bug. It is a known, documented and
expected feature. It is utilized, for example, for the volume header
backup/restore operation.
Quotes from the TrueCrypt documentation:
"WARNING: Restoring
