linux SGID-man exploit

2000-02-28 Thread mario paskual
/* *** *** agroMANauer.c *** *** linux SGID-man exploit *** *** by [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2000 *** *** tested on RedHat 5.1 *** *** It gives

Re: SGID man

1999-08-06 Thread Henrik Nordstrom
Isaac To wrote: > But yes, it is ugly. It might be better if any SGID program is also SUID > nobody, and re-acquire real user privilege only when required. But still, > it is ugly. That is not a viable approach unless the binary (and all other binaries owned by nobody) also is immutable. If th

Re: SGID man

1999-08-04 Thread Isaac To
>>>>> "Solar" == Solar Designer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Solar> I wouldn't normally post this, but while we're on the topic... Solar> There's an ancient problem with SGID man that I keep seeing on Solar> various systems.

Re: SGID man

1999-08-03 Thread Henrik Nordstrom
Solar Designer wrote: > [ghost@alice ghost]$ man id > Formatting page, please wait... > [ghost@alice ghost]$ ls -l /var/catman/cat1/id.1.gz > -r--rw-r-- 1 ghostman 806 Aug 1 06:14 /var/catman/cat1/id.1.gz On some systems you can prevent this by making the catman directories suid

SGID man

1999-08-02 Thread Solar Designer
tories, but is less obvious how to elevate these > privilegies to get more privilegies. I wouldn't normally post this, but while we're on the topic... There's an ancient problem with SGID man that I keep seeing on various systems. For example, on Red Hat 5.2: [ghost@alice ghost]$ l