Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-10 Thread bugtraq
On Tue, Jan 09, 2007 at 12:15:02AM -0600, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > > bugtraq wrote: > > > > a quick fix for this can be available at least on bsd, there is accf_http > > that can be modified not to pass the connection to apache until a full > > request > > is read (either get or post, full

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-09 Thread William A. Rowe, Jr.
bugtraq wrote: > > a quick fix for this can be available at least on bsd, there is accf_http > that can be modified not to pass the connection to apache until a full request > is read (either get or post, full, not just the first get request header, > of course this can be even worst for a lot o

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-08 Thread bugtraq
to kill is enough not to finish the request and let it timeout on server side. no ddos/dos protection layers can stand against this attack (as far as i know) and the scenario is simple 1. fingerprint the timeout on serverside 2. dig the sitemap from target 3. build a list of browsers to advertis

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-08 Thread Gadi Evron
On Wed, 3 Jan 2007, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > Michal Zalewski wrote: > > I feel silly for reporting this, but I couldn't help but notice that > > Apache and IIS both have a bizarro implementation of HTTP/1.1 "Range" > > header functionality (as defined by RFC 2616). Their implementations allow

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Michal Zalewski
On Thu, 4 Jan 2007, Michal Zalewski wrote: > On Thu, 4 Jan 2007, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > > 2) Theoretical window size limits and commonly implemented settings do > have a side effect of making such attacks more feasible for > attackers with a very limited bandwidth available. The

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Rob Sherwood
On Thu, Jan 04, 2007 at 12:45:35PM +0100, Pieter de Boer wrote: > Michal Zalewski wrote: > > 2) Negotiate a high TCP window size for each of the connections (1 GB > > should be doable), > > > For instance, FreeBSD by default has TCP send buffers set to 32KB. It > does not (apart from recent

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Siim Põder
Michal Zalewski wrote: > 1) Connect to the server (as many times as allowed by the remote party > or deemed appropriate for the purpose of this demonstration), > > 2) Negotiate a high TCP window size for each of the connections (1 GB > should be doable), > > 3) Send a partial requ

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Pieter de Boer
Michal Zalewski wrote: 2) Negotiate a high TCP window size for each of the connections (1 GB should be doable), Just zooming in on one detail of your e-mail. While you could set your own TCP receive window to 1GB, you obviously can't set the sender's send window to 1GB if it doesn't w

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Michal Zalewski
On Thu, 4 Jan 2007, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > On the matter of your 1GB window (which is, again, the real issue), you have > any examples of a kernel that permits that large a sliding window buffer by > default No, I simply mentioned the hypothetical maximum; common configurations for high-pe

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread William A. Rowe, Jr.
Michal Zalewski wrote: > On Wed, 3 Jan 2007, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > >> If you have an issue with this behavior, of HTTP, then you have an issue >> with the behavior under FTP or a host of other protocols. > > Not really; see above. These are typically well known, preventable by > configuri

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread Michal Zalewski
On Wed, 3 Jan 2007, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote: > Seriously, HTTP pipelining can accomplish EXACTLY the same thing with minimal > pain. No, it can't. Client-side pipelining using simultaneous sessions with keep-alives is usually severely restricted on server-side (exactly for the reason they can

Re: a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-04 Thread William A. Rowe, Jr.
Michal Zalewski wrote: > I feel silly for reporting this, but I couldn't help but notice that > Apache and IIS both have a bizarro implementation of HTTP/1.1 "Range" > header functionality (as defined by RFC 2616). Their implementations allow > the same fragment of a file to be requested an arbitra

a cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question)

2007-01-03 Thread Michal Zalewski
I feel silly for reporting this, but I couldn't help but notice that Apache and IIS both have a bizarro implementation of HTTP/1.1 "Range" header functionality (as defined by RFC 2616). Their implementations allow the same fragment of a file to be requested an arbitrary number of times, and each re