Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread Mark Crispin
On Mon, 17 Apr 2000 23:02:48 -0700, R. C. Dowdeswell wrote: > Using chroot in a lot of situations is rather dangerous, and one > must carefully set up the environment that it runs in. Yes. This is why I would never do it by default; it's something that the site has to turn on explictly (and they

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread der Mouse
> Can we please [] discuss the facts rationally? > 1) There is no added vulnerability at all for a UNIX system which >permits shell access. This is not quite true. There is no added vulnerability for a system which permits shell access with the same pair which gives mailbox access. One si

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread Warner Losh
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Mark Crispin writes: : Last but not least, I am very interested in Kris Kennaway's claim : that "It may also be possible to break out of the chroot jail on : some platforms." If true, it represents a huge root-level security : hole on those platforms. I simply do n

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread R. C. Dowdeswell
On 956021099 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch Mark Crispin wrote: > >The final form of the CHROOT_SERVER code, which will be an option in the next >distributed version, consists of: > if (chroot (home ? home : ANONYMOUSHOME)) return NIL; > home = "/"; >And, yes, this will do the nec

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread Henrik Nordstrom
Mark Crispin wrote: > Last but not least, I am very interested in Kris Kennaway's claim that "It may > also be possible to break out of the chroot jail on some platforms." If true, > it represents a huge root-level security hole on those platforms. I simply do > not believe the claim. I would

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-19 Thread Darren Moffat - Solaris Sustaining Engineering
>Last but not least, I am very interested in Kris Kennaway's claim that "It may >also be possible to break out of the chroot jail on some platforms." If It is possible, especially if you have /proc mounted. It is made even more likely if you have processes inside and outside of the chroot envir

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-17 Thread Mark Crispin
Can we please avoid hyperbole (such as "Seattle disease"), and discuss the facts rationally? 1) There is no added vulnerability at all for a UNIX system which permits shell access. I don't have sufficient data to know what percentage of UW imapd sites run IMAP servers on top of shell UNIX

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-17 Thread Kris Kennaway
On Mon, 17 Apr 2000, Mark Crispin wrote: > As was indicated, all privileges are dropped at that point. There is nothing > that can be done by crashing imapd this way that can not also be done (much > easier) by logging in to the UNIX shell. This does not seem to be enough: many people run mail

Re: response to the bugtraq report of buffer overruns in imapd LIST command

2000-04-17 Thread Theo de Raadt
> The recent BUGTRAQ report about a way to cause the LIST command to get a > buffer overflow was just forwarded to me. > > As was indicated, all privileges are dropped at that point. There is nothing > that can be done by crashing imapd this way that can not also be done (much > easier) by loggin