This is my point exactly. I don't allow my IDS to respond to attacks for
the very reason you stated. It could easily force a DoS. I think a lot
of people don't take this into consideration. The vendors push automatic
response as a sexy feature when it really could be a major nuisance. Let
each piece of the puzzle do what it was designed for, no crossover. The
"D" in IDS stands for detection, I didn't install and IDRS. *The "R" is
for response if anyone missed that.

I try to use the most cost effective measures in a layered approach to
security. Anyone who throws up a firewall and thinks they are secure is
usually in for a big surprise. The most cost effective and easy approach
to security is just to keep your systems patched! This is simple and
would probably fight off 98% of all problems. The SQL Slammer worm is a
perfect example. The patch was available months ago! Security is a VERY
dynamic process.

I use and IDS to help identify problem IPs, what type of attacks do I
need to make sure I protected against, and auditing. The problem with an
IDS is it can only identify attacks in progress on the wire. An IDS does
NOT acknowledge if attacks were successful. This is where the layered
approach comes in and the most important piece of the whole puzzle is so
basic.... a clearly defined corporate security policy with teeth. How
many individuals realize 80% of all attacks and problems are not from
external threats but from employees?

I take security very seriously. I worked for a company once who was
about to throw up an E-commerce site that generated $1.5M the first year
behind a Microsoft Proxy Server. I had to scream, complain, and scare
the hell out of the executives before the coughed up the bucks for an
adequate security implementation.

An IDS is a tool, a mere piece of the security pie. NEVER put all of
your security eggs into one basket or there sure to get cracked. That's
pretty catchy. I need to remember that one.

-----Original Message-----
From: Carroll Kong [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2003 8:35 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: ISS Real Secure Vs Cisco IDS [7:63461]-Automated IDS
[7:63557]


I cut out some of the other messages to concentrate on one issue, 
automated IDS responses.  If your automated IDS responses result in a 
"automated" packet filter of any sort, I think you are doing yourself 
a disservice.  You might stop some kiddies, but you are just leaving 
yourself wide open to professionals who can DoS you very easily.

I suppose if everyone just started filtering at the edge to help 
prevent spoofing, but alas, that is not the reality of today's 
networks.

It should be trivial for the attacker to DoS your systems beyond 
compare.  For example, what if he spoofs a trusted host?  Now your 
trusted host cannot have access anymore.  Ok, so what if you have 
exceptions for the trusted host?  Now he has a host worth spoofing 
for, DoS trusted host, assume trusted host's identity.  Easier said 
than done and you can mitigate the risk with stuff like mac address 
port locking, anti-spoofing acls, but just to give you some ideas 
that automated IDS responses can be particularly dangerous.

Not even factoring the possibility you can lose accessibility to many 
systems, but most firewall products have some pitiful limitations 
(one can easily blow out any stateful firewall), and you can be 
assured your acls will grow to be so big your firewall just might 
keel over.  I hope you got default-closed systems.  ;)  But I suppose 
it won't matter at that point, your network will be down, or your IDS 
might be filled with so much "garbage" that you might not see the 
real attack come through for your "forensics" team to discover which 
hosts have been compromised.

> Come on now, the slammer worm? If you are security conscious this
> shouldn't have had any effect on you. Microsoft released a patch last
> summer.  Security is a best effort solution. It is about layers and
> maintenance. You cannot eliminate risk, you can only reduce risk.
> 
> An IDSs responsibility is to pick up attacks on the wire, not prevent
> them. I personally don't believe in allowing my IDS to respond to an
> attack.
> 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of
> Albert Lu
> Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 9:19 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: ISS Real Secure Vs Cisco IDS [7:63461]
> 
> Hi Troy,
> 
> Must be some secure site, reason I was interested is that I had a
> discussion
> with someone else before in regards to multi-vendor IDS solutions and
> how
> effective they might be.
> 
> So if you mostly rely on manual action, and an attack came in after
> hours,
> how quickly can you respond to your alerts? Since for some attacks, a
> half
> hour response time could cause your site to be down (eg. slammer
virus).
> If
> that was the case, even if you had all the vendor's IDS, it will be
> useless.
> 
> Albert
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, February 21, 2003 10:57 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: ISS Real Secure Vs Cisco IDS [7:63461]
> 
> 
> As with most things, you need to way up costs againts your
requirements.
> IN
> our case, security is absolutely essential, so having a multivendor
> security
> solutions (and indeed fully redundant) is costly, but we see it as
> justified.
> 
> With regards to action during attacks etc.  We mostly rely on manual
> actions
> as we dont want to inadvertently block legitimate traffic (for example
> if an
> attack came from a spoofed IP). For automatic action, you can make use
> of
> Ciso Policy manage, which has the ability to dynamically rewrite
ACL's,
> on
> Pix's, Routers, and indeed Cat's.  according to data from IDS.  So for
> example, if you where really paraniod (like we are),. you could have
> pix's
> as the first firewall, with IDS on the inside / dmz etc (using IDSM or
> standalone IDS), tie these together with Policy manager .. then taking
a
> further step into your network, a set of Nokia Fw1 NG, along with
> further
> Nokia IDS solutions on the inside, and tied together using the
> enterprisef
> software!
> 
> 
> 



-Carroll Kong




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