Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-21 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Fri, Sep 18, 2009 at 08:52:32PM -0700, Kevin Graham wrote: > Sorry, the thought of being able to plan forward-looking purchases and > technology migrations this beautifully makes me tingly... _These_ > would be the moves of a dominant market leader with a rich innovative > history. Full

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-18 Thread Kevin Graham
> I think this is really the thing that annoys me most - they know how > to do it right, and conciously decided to go the other way. Yep. The single biggest reason I'm not advocating Nexus 5000/7000's today is the lack of NX-OS on the Sup720. If there was roadmap for it to also include existing D

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-18 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 12:46:44PM -0700, Kevin Graham wrote: > Though there's always bumps, but the GSR (IOS->XR) and 6500 (CatOS->IOS) were > well-executed, customer focused migrations that allowed each to move forward > without alienating an existing install base and complicating future pur

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-17 Thread Kevin Graham
> On the other hand, do you remember how long did it take to run native IOS on > 65xx with the majority (not all) of the CatOS features? Considering "IOS Feature Parity" was an SXI objective, quite a bit. It took a long time, but the fundamental difference is that eventual convergence was alw

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-17 Thread John Kougoulos
On Thu, 17 Sep 2009, David Hughes wrote: On 16/09/2009, at 6:06 PM, Gert Doering wrote: Just imagine how much functionality NX-OS could get if they would stop wasting effort on 17 different software trains for "classic IOS" and instead focus on getting NX-OS on all hardware platforms, and g

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-16 Thread Tim Durack
On Wed, Sep 16, 2009 at 7:43 PM, David Hughes wrote: > > On 16/09/2009, at 6:06 PM, Gert Doering wrote: > > Just imagine how much functionality NX-OS could get if they would stop >> wasting effort on 17 different software trains for "classic IOS" and >> instead focus on getting NX-OS on all hard

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-16 Thread David Hughes
On 16/09/2009, at 6:06 PM, Gert Doering wrote: Just imagine how much functionality NX-OS could get if they would stop wasting effort on 17 different software trains for "classic IOS" and instead focus on getting NX-OS on all hardware platforms, and getting feature parity for it. Totally agree

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-16 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 05:30:11PM +0100, Alan Buxey wrote: > > that is not feasible, completely abandon IOS and provide XE or NX-OS > > on *all* platforms) > > NX-OS on all platforms? nothanks - some of us want functionality ;-) The problem with the multitude of different operating systems

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-16 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 10:47:17AM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote: > On Sep 14, 2009, at 10:36 AM, Gert Doering wrote: > > >On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 09:52:36AM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote: > >>While you're at it, ask for protected memory in the software. It's > >>not like ram/flash are expensive these

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Kevin Graham
> > that is not feasible, completely abandon IOS and provide XE or NX-OS > > on *all* platforms) > > NX-OS on all platforms? nothanks - some of us want functionality ;-) No, that's exactly the problem. The balkanization of the OS platforms only amplifies this; "non-core" functionality such as

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Kevin Graham
> It's sad when you see all the effort that went into the modular over the > years > being thrown away/ignored then keep having devices crash with more > catastrophic > outcomes and no usable debugging information. Indeed, that too and the (much anticipated) promise of hot-patching never seem

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 09:52:36AM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote: > While you're at it, ask for protected memory in the software. It's > not like ram/flash are expensive these days... Does "modular" have that? Or not yet? (I want to see modular on *all* IOS based platforms, and not as a some

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Jared Mauch
On Sep 14, 2009, at 10:36 AM, Gert Doering wrote: Hi, On Mon, Sep 14, 2009 at 09:52:36AM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote: While you're at it, ask for protected memory in the software. It's not like ram/flash are expensive these days... Does "modular" have that? Or not yet? (I want to see modula

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Alan Buxey
Hi, > that is not feasible, completely abandon IOS and provide XE or NX-OS > on *all* platforms) NX-OS on all platforms? nothanks - some of us want functionality ;-) alan ___ cisco-nsp mailing list cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net https://puck.nether.net/mai

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-14 Thread Jared Mauch
On Sep 13, 2009, at 10:28 PM, Kevin Graham wrote: Sorry for the late response, had to dig through some old cases... But anyway - my routers are lying to me. They list *.179 just fine (BGP), but all the other interesting stuff (telnet, ssh, ldp) is not there... Last dug into this 2.5y a

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-13 Thread Kevin Graham
Sorry for the late response, had to dig through some old cases... > But anyway - my routers are lying to me. They list *.179 just fine (BGP), > but all the other interesting stuff (telnet, ssh, ldp) is not there... Last dug into this 2.5y ago (while looking into PSIRT cisco-sa-20070131-sip) and

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Mark Meijerink
Gert, When I run the command I see al the active BGP/SSH/LDP sessions with Local Address, Foreign Address and state (ESTAB/LISTEN) There is one entry in the table which I find a bit strange. *.* *.*LISTEN Listener on all ports??? Regards, Mark

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 09:50:23AM -0400, Randy McAnally wrote: > > So - to summarize this: "the only way to reliably detect what sockets > > the box is listening on is to run nmap against it", right? > > Regardless, run NMAP anyways. Never trust what the box tells you even if it > did list

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Randy McAnally
> So - to summarize this: "the only way to reliably detect what sockets > the box is listening on is to run nmap against it", right? Regardless, run NMAP anyways. Never trust what the box tells you even if it did list your listening ports 'properly'. -- Randy ___

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 09:22:04AM -0400, Eloy Paris wrote: > > But anyway - my routers are lying to me. They list *.179 just fine (BGP), > > but all the other interesting stuff (telnet, ssh, ldp) is not there... > > In a Cisco Security Advisory that we published last year > (http://www.cisc

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 03:09:43PM +0200, Mark Meijerink wrote: > When I run the command I see al the active BGP/SSH/LDP sessions with Local > Address, Foreign Address and state (ESTAB/LISTEN) Which IOS version is that? I tried with 12.2S and 12.2SXF and SXI2, and while I see telnet/LDP as

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Eloy Paris
Hi Gert, On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 02:16:17PM +0200, Gert Doering wrote: > Hi, > > On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 01:48:46PM +0200, Mark Meijerink wrote: > > When your run the show tcp brief all command you also see the listening > > ports. > > > > router#show tcp brief ? > > all All end-points (eve

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-10 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 01:48:46PM +0200, Mark Meijerink wrote: > When your run the show tcp brief all command you also see the listening ports. > > router#show tcp brief ? > all All end-points (even listeners) Oh. Cool. For whatever reason, I overlooked this. But anyway - my routers a

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-09 Thread Justin Shore
Antonio Soares wrote: Hello group, What actions are you taking ? What is the real risk ? http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090908-tcp24.shtml If I'm reading the notes correctly, to exploit the problem the attacker must be able to complete a TCP 3-way handshake. That would impl

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-09 Thread Gert Doering
Hi, On Wed, Sep 09, 2009 at 06:52:04PM +0100, Antonio Soares wrote: > What actions are you taking ? What is the real risk ? > > http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090908-tcp24.shtml "scream, wave your arms, run around in circles"... Seriously: I'm not exactly sure what the actual i

Re: [c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: TCP State Manipulation Denial ofService Vulnerabilities in Multiple Cisco Products

2009-09-09 Thread Antonio Soares
Hello group, What actions are you taking ? What is the real risk ? http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090908-tcp24.shtml Thanks. Regards, Antonio Soares, CCIE #18473 (R&S) amsoa...@netcabo.pt ___ cisco-nsp mailing list cisco-nsp@puc