Re: having source code for your CPU chip -- NOT

> On the other hand, having the actual CPU source, we could stop worrying > about Intel's ID gaffs, and RNG support, and "know" it is built correctly. Even if you designed the chip and contracted out the fabrication, you will not know that it is built correctly. Even if you ran the fab and shutt

Ecash without a mint

Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I wouldn't say ecash has to use blinding, but I would argue it would > be a misuse of the word "ecash", if something which was revocable were > dubbed ecash. > > With that definition it is not technically possible to implement > electronic cash at all witho

ECC '99 third announcement

-- Forwarded message -- Subject: ECC '99 third announcement (revised) Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1999 08:47:56 -0400 To: Frances Hannigan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> From: Frances Hannigan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> = The 3rd workshop on Elliptic C

RSA Security, Inc.

[I felt I had to forward this on since I forwarded the first one. I'd really rather we avoid the entire RSADSI as angel/satan debate here in the future, though. --Perry] Russell Nelson, President of Crynwr Software, a prominent Internet activist, and a leading Open Source advocate, rewr

Re: more re Encryption Technology Limits Eased

Bill Simpson said: > > - We just learned a few weeks ago that every copy of Windows has a secret > NSA key. We don't know why. Remember the Lotus Notes secret NSA key > fiasco that got us in trouble with the Swedish government? How can we > ever compete, when nobody trusts our software?

ADMIN: mysterious bounces

I believe I may have tracked down the source of the mysterious bounces that were impacting everyone who sent mail to the list. If anyone gets any more of these (i.e. errors that go to the sender and not to the list manager), please let me know. -- Perry Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- "A

Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?

At 04:22 PM 09/17/1999 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: >Of course, it's by no means obvious that a judge will permit that provision to >stand. A more likely outcome is similar to the anti-"greymail" law, where the >judge gets to examine the evidence privately. If it's useless to the defense,

RE: more re Encryption Technology Limits Eased

Jay Holovacs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I would like to see some discussion of what are the actual possible CPU > subversions. All the obvious subversions would seem to require a > cooperating OS... Pure speculation, but what if copying a certain 256-bit string caused the program counter to pick up

RE: more re Encryption Technology Limits Eased

At 10:26 PM 9/17/1999 +0100, Antonomasia wrote: >From: Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> after he began talking about some very curious, very complex, very >> undocumented instruction he discovered in late-model CPU's. Instructions >> that will put the processor into a mode that makes OS protec

No liberalization for source code, API's

There's been some discussion of this in the press, but not much discussion of the specifics. BXA has published a "question-and-answer" document discussing the anticipated regulations; it's available at , and John Young has archived a copy at

Re: more re Encryption Technology Limits Eased

Zombie Cow wrote: > Or start producing Open Sourced CPUs and motherboards. > > IBM has an Open Source PPC motherboard, and here's an > article referring to an Open Source CPU by Sun: > > (Well, they're not really "Open Source", but still, open enough..) > (Search www.techweb.com for the source U

Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Howie Goodell writes: > It's (2) that's the real problem. They have this message they > claim came from you, but the link to you is secret (maliced keyboards; Windows 2000 backdoors, etc.) This has nothing to do > with encryption -- since the evidence is plaintex