Re: IT Companies Promote New Standard For Phone Security (was Re: Edupage, 29 September 1999)

1999-09-30 Thread William H. Geiger III
In , on 09/29/99 at 11:29 PM, Robert Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: >Why do I keep thinking "Radicchio" really gonna be another GSM >"Pinocchio"? Because money is more important than morality to these people. They will cave to the LEA's just like

Rumor of a working quantum computer

1999-09-30 Thread Keith Dawson
Anyone heard word on this rumor? The Sunday Times story claims that a European Institute of Quantum Computing Network has been hastily formed to develop commercial banking codes based on quantum entanglement. The institute was founded a few weeks after news leaked from the Israel's Weizmann I

IT Companies Promote New Standard For Phone Security (was Re:Edupage, 29 September 1999)

1999-09-30 Thread Robert Hettinga
Why do I keep thinking "Radicchio" really gonna be another GSM "Pinocchio"? Cheers, RAH At 5:02 PM -0600 on 9/29/99, EDUCAUSE wrote: > IT COMPANIES PROMOTE NEW STANDARD FOR PHONE SECURITY > EDS, France's Gemplus, Sonera, and Ericsson have founded a forum > called "Radicchio" to promote a worl

KeyNote RFC now available

1999-09-30 Thread Matt Blaze
The official version of the RFC describing "The KeyNote Trust Management System, Version 2" has been published as RFC 2704. This document provides the complete, official description of the KeyNote language syntax and semantics as well as a basic discussion of the architectural implications of int

Re: IBM to built crypto-on-a-chip into all its PCs

1999-09-30 Thread William H. Geiger III
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, on 09/30/99 at 11:39 AM, Damien Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said: >-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- >Hash: SHA1 >On Tue, 28 Sep 1999, William H. Geiger III wrote: >> In , on 09/27/99 >>at 03:41 PM, Robert Hettinga <[EMAI

Re: IBM to built crypto-on-a-chip into all its PCs

1999-09-30 Thread Damien Miller
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Wed, 29 Sep 1999, William H. Geiger III wrote: > >If you do not trust the crypto processor then you should throw the whole > >machine out - there are *so* many other ways that IBM could have > >compromised the system. > > So you suggest the h