Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

Dan Geer wrote: >I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will remain an >area of sustainable lead, that traffic analysis is the only >area where commercial interests will not naturally marshall >the resources to threaten the lead of the national agencies. This may well be. However, a writ

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

I agree with Peter and Arnold; in fact, I am convinced that as of this date, there are only two areas where national agencies have a lead over the private/international sector, namely one-time-pad deployment and traffic analysis. Of those, I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will rema

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

At 12:38 PM -0800 2/11/2000, David Wagner wrote: >In article , >Arnold G. Reinhold <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a >> higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by > > law

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Arnold G. Reinhold) writes: >I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and available >to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE huge leap forward >in traffic analyses. That's not unique to Clipper though, I bet there are systems out there

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and available to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE huge leap forward in traffic analyses. In other-words, all the digital messages from various capstone devices could work their way around the world and LE would ha

Re: US congressman blasts China crypto policy

previously sent to WSJ: | To the Editor: | | As reported, the Chinese government has moved to restrict the use | of privacy-enhancing technologies and to surveill use of the Internet | generally. Any country that does that ensures that in the global | economy the only role they can play

Re: Coerced decryption?

Russell Nelson writes: > Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which > always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys: > one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which > retrieves to the second (innocuous) document. This idea has b

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

What is current thinking of the AES finalists on NSA review of the proposals. Will there be (or has there been), say, overtures made to the developers to cooperate with national security and/or law enforcement requirements. Or is an alternate, parallel successor to DES underway for that dual- o

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

In article , Arnold G. Reinhold <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a > higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by > law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement friendly is v

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

At 8:02 AM -0500 2/12/2000, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications", >R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0]. >The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT >codeword, not an IN

Re: Coerced decryption?

Russell Nelson wrote: > > Caspar Bowden writes: > > And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services > > should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the > > plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who > > refuse

Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications", R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0]. The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT codeword, not an INFOSEC one, so the people who designed the thing were

Re: Coerced decryption?

Russell Nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which >> always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys: >> one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which >> retrieves to the second (innocuous) d

RE: Coerced decryption?

It's "deniable encryption." One link is: http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/home/naor/public_html/PAPERS/deniable_abs.h tml -Original Message- From: Russell Nelson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 10:31 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Coerced decryption? Caspa

TechWeb 10/2/2000: "E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation'"

http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB2210S0005 E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation' (02/10/00, 12:58 p.m. ET) By Madeleine Acey, TechWeb The British government published a bill Thursday to update law enforcement's interception powers to include communications made via company network

Coerced decryption?

Caspar Bowden writes: > And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services > should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the > plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who > refuse. Nobody's mentioned the possibili

Re: Anyone have a copy of Chaum's "security w/o ID" paper?

On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, Jim McCoy wrote: > It seems that with digicash under new management the old papers archive has > melted away. Does anyone have a (postscript) copy of the "Security Without > Identification: Transaction Systems To Make Big Brother Obsolete" paper by > David Chaum? The p

FT 11/2/2000: "BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law"

http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q34646a.htm Financial Times, Friday February 11 2000 BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law By Jean Eaglesham, Legal Correspondent The government will face an "inevitable" human rights challenge to a new law unveiled yesterday allowing officials to b

Anyone have a copy of Chaum's "security w/o ID" paper?

It seems that with digicash under new management the old papers archive has melted away. Does anyone have a (postscript) copy of the "Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems To Make Big Brother Obsolete" paper by David Chaum? The postscript version had some illustrations which ma

BBC Online 10/2/2000: "UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law"

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_638000/638041.stm UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law At issue is the burden of proof The UK Government came under fire on Thursday from the internet community after it published a Bill to regulate covert surveillance. The critics say the leg

DMCA Comments Due

Forward: Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 23:02:12 -0500 Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> From: Seth Finkelstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: DMCA Anti-Circumvention comments - deadline Feb 17 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Did you like

Re: Godzilla crypto tutorial updated

[I have sent to Declan, cypherpunks, and cryptography. Please forward appropriately. -Shabbir] ICIJ, a working network of the world's leading investigative reporters, is seeking volunteers to help ICIJ members in Latin America install PGP. Note that PGP training is provided by ICIJ staff, a

US congressman blasts China crypto policy

Beijing slammed over encryption --- A United States Congressman has criticised new encryption regulations released by Beijing, calling them a major invasion of privacy against computer users worldwide, including US citizens. "It'

Re: paycash: blind signature etc.

--- begin forwarded text Reply-To: "Victor Dostov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> From: "Victor Dostov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: paycash: blind signature etc. Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 18:33:39 +0300 Status: U it's our fault with Russia

Re: paycash: blind signature etc.

So the main document I've found (blsig.doc) is doubly obfuscated, once in Russian, and once in Word's .doc format. .Doc is clearly the more annoying of these. Are there other docs in English? Anyway, has anyone taken a look at what the system offers? It looks to us like its covered by Chaum's

DCSB: Brad Hillis; Implementing State Digital Signature Laws

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:54:41 -0500 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: DCSB: Brad Hillis; Implementing State Digital Signature Laws Cc: "Hillis, Brad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "AndrŽ Dubois" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,

Re: paycash: blind signature etc.

At 12:34 AM -0500 on 2/9/00, Adam Shostack wrote: > Anyway, has anyone taken a look at what the system offers? It looks > to us like its covered by Chaum's blinding patent. They even call the > functions in schemas 1 & 2 "B" and "U", apparently for blinding and > unblinding. My understanding,