Cryptography Publishing Project makes MIT Kerberos V5 release 1.2.1 available

2000-12-02 Thread Marc Horowitz
In order to provide people outside the US with access to open source cryptography, the Cryptography Publishing Project is making MIT Kerberos V5 release 1.2.1 available without restriction, in compliance with the changes in US export regulations since January, 2000. The Project was started to

Re: FBI announcement on email search 'Carnivore'

2000-07-12 Thread Marc Horowitz
"Steven M. Bellovin" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: In this situation, everyone's email has to be scanned in order to isolate the desired traffic. I've seen this claim before, and I don't think it's true. It's like saying to wiretap my phone calls, you need to tap an entire fiber, and do

another take on electronic voting

2000-05-31 Thread Marc Horowitz
While we sit here and talk about integrity of voting systems, receiptless systems, threat models, and strong crypto, I ran across this: http://www.pcworld.com/pcwtoday/article/0%2C1510%2C16951%2C00.html Major League Baseball's (MLB) All-Star Game has been taking great pains to make

Re: Pass phrases, Hushmail and Ziplip

2000-05-15 Thread Marc Horowitz
"Arnold G. Reinhold" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I'm not picking on Hushmail. Hushmail is a fairly good privacy product. It should protect against the average office snoop or an employer that wants to monitor employee e-mail. In fact, I'd give their work a 95%. Unfortunately, 95% is not a

Re: GPS and cell phones

2000-05-10 Thread Marc Horowitz
Lyle Seaman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: This is e911 service. Much as I dislike government intrusion, I sure would like to have a device with a button that says "call help and *tell them where I am*" The question is if the device will tell them *only* when I press the button.

Re: Microsoft to publish details of Kerberos Authorisation Data in Windows 2000

2000-05-02 Thread Marc Horowitz
Grant Bayley [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The silly part is, and I hope someone from Microsoft is listening, but why is this document distributed as a .exe file when the previous page says "Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader"? Microsoft hasn't yet figured out how to digitally sign content without

Re: Coerced decryption?

2000-02-11 Thread Marc Horowitz
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys: one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which retrieves to the second (innocuous) document.

Re: BXA Press Release on New Regs

2000-01-12 Thread Marc Horowitz
"R. A. Hettinga" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Since the state is, in a world of ubiquitous networks and financial cryptography, going the way of the Church (i.e. more ceremony than hegemony) I bet 1gAU (compounded) that, 400 years from now, cryptography will *still* be a munition. I claim that

Re: Bernstein Delay Motion

1999-10-19 Thread Marc Horowitz
John Young [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: It is possible that the revised regulations will not materially change the treatment of source code. But it is also possible that the revised regulations will alter the treatment of source code in ways that could have a bearing on the constitutional

Re: Why did White House change its mind on crypto?

1999-09-18 Thread Marc Horowitz
bram [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I don't believe the courts will allow the government to present evidence without giving the defense a chance to contest the means used to obtain it. The same could be said about the movie rating system, child pornography, and crypto export laws. Just

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-19 Thread Marc Horowitz
Sandy Harris [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: /dev/random uses SHA or MD5, so a complete break appears highly unlikely. But a special-case break, say in circumstances where the input entropy is temporarily exhausted so the attacker gets a look at N successive results where the pool does not change,

Re: sendmail patch for smtps (SSL-SMTP)?

1999-07-05 Thread Marc Horowitz
"Lucky Green" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Ouch. Seems somebody is busy making certain that one won't be able to use standard US distributions of these implementations much longer to trivially implement the secure protocols by adding a wrapper. This is very bad news, indeed. The IETF is more

Re: personal encryption? (fwd)

1999-06-22 Thread Marc Horowitz
Dan Geer [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: this does not lead to secret messages. this leads to the ultimate in biometrics. Do you imply having a machine with PCR's for some unique string in the authenticator's DNA? I see two problems. First, twins. Second, it's possible to grow DNA from

Re: personal encryption? (fwd)

1999-06-10 Thread Marc Horowitz
"Arnold G. Reinhold" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: It seems to me that you could use the DNA encodings for common words like "the" and "and" as a marker for PCR. A soop of such initiators, followed by a gel for the longest fragments should crack this code quickly. You might need a second

Re: Everyone wants in on the act...

1999-05-17 Thread Marc Horowitz
"Perry E. Metzger" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WANTS ISPs TO SPY The European Parliament last Friday passed the Lawful Interception of Communications council resolution on new technologies -- known as Enfopol -- which requires Internet service providers and telephone