In the NIPC daily report for 6 Sep., I read
> (U) (InfoSec News, 5 September) The UK government officially granted
> itself broad powers [...]. Under a provision of RIP, if a company
> official is asked to surrender an encryption key to the government, that
> individual is barred by law from tell
On Thu, 7 Sep 2000, Matt Crawford wrote:
>> Guidelines for this "tipping-off" offense, as it is known,
>> could leave an international company completely unaware that what it
>> assumes is secure company data may be under investigation by MI5. Those
>> violating the tipping-off offense can face
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Ray Dillinger, at 11:48 -0700 on Thu, 7 Sep 2000, wrote:
> And I'm not really as concerned about them *accessing* encrypted
> data (though that's bad enough, Gods know) as I'm concerned about
> the possibility of them modifying data, forging signat
At 11:48 AM 9/7/00 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>
>On Thu, 7 Sep 2000, Matt Crawford wrote:
>>If it takes the conscious participation of 10 employees to divulge
>>a key when demanded, it will be that much harder to prosecute for
>>"tipping-off".
>
>It's not clear to me how you could set up a situat
You're being a mathematician. Be a cop instead.
Police manage to arrest people all the time for, say, murder, even
though mathematically there are lots of people who could have committed
the crime. Perhaps 10 different people have had to disclose shares of
the key to Inspector Lestrade. B
