Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

Dan Geer said: > I agree with Peter and Arnold; in fact, I am convinced that > as of this date, there are only two areas where national > agencies have a lead over the private/international sector, > namely one-time-pad deployment and traffic analysis. What about production cryptanalysis, like t

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

At 5:09 PM -0500 2/11/2000, Dan Geer wrote: >I agree with Peter and Arnold; in fact, I am convinced that >as of this date, there are only two areas where national >agencies have a lead over the private/international sector, >namely one-time-pad deployment and traffic analysis. Of those, >I would

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

Dan Geer wrote: >I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will remain an >area of sustainable lead, that traffic analysis is the only >area where commercial interests will not naturally marshall >the resources to threaten the lead of the national agencies. This may well be. However, a writ

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

I agree with Peter and Arnold; in fact, I am convinced that as of this date, there are only two areas where national agencies have a lead over the private/international sector, namely one-time-pad deployment and traffic analysis. Of those, I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will rema

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

At 12:38 PM -0800 2/11/2000, David Wagner wrote: >In article , >Arnold G. Reinhold <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a >> higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by > > law

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Arnold G. Reinhold) writes: >I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and available >to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE huge leap forward >in traffic analyses. That's not unique to Clipper though, I bet there are systems out there

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and available to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE huge leap forward in traffic analyses. In other-words, all the digital messages from various capstone devices could work their way around the world and LE would ha

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

What is current thinking of the AES finalists on NSA review of the proposals. Will there be (or has there been), say, overtures made to the developers to cooperate with national security and/or law enforcement requirements. Or is an alternate, parallel successor to DES underway for that dual- o

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

In article , Arnold G. Reinhold <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a > higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by > law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement friendly is v

Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

At 8:02 AM -0500 2/12/2000, Peter Gutmann wrote: >Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications", >R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0]. >The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT >codeword, not an IN

Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications", R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0]. The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT codeword, not an INFOSEC one, so the people who designed the thing were