Eli Brandt writes:
If so, doubling the cap size halves the cutoff frequency (right?),
halving the leaked power. Integrating runs gives signal voltage
linear in n and noise voltage sqrt(n); voltage ratio is sqrt; power
ratio is linear. So leaked-signal power is
Theta(
Andreas Bogk wrote on 1999-09-15 00:04 UTC:
The usual setup for DPA involves a 10 Ohm resistor which sits in the
power supply and measuring the voltage across that resistor. The
countermeasure we're talking about is an on-chip capacitor that
smoothes the power consumption, or a power supply
Eugene Leitl wrote:
I don't quite understand your handwave analysis: if we use
supercapacitors we can power the embedded unit for hours straight.
Okay, so you charge and then disconnect from the power source to
execute. I got the impression we were talking about using the cap as
you would in
At 1:35 PM -0700 9/14/99, John Gilmore wrote:
At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
Why don't you just erase flash when a pressure change (hull breach) is
detected. Using double-walled hull, to look for shortcuts. You can
also couple this to light detection, and whatnot.
Arnold
At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
Why don't you just erase flash when a pressure change (hull breach) is
detected. Using double-walled hull, to look for shortcuts. You can
also couple this to light detection, and whatnot.
Andreas Bogk writes:
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
John Gilmore writes:
What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
require any physical attack, nor does it deal with voltage
variations. (You are probably thinking of Shamir's fault-injection
You can't do differential power analysis if you supply power
At 01:35 PM 9/14/99 -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
What are you guys talking about? Differential power analysis doesn't
The power analysis thread mutated into a tamper-react thread
without changing the Subject line.
At 10:32 AM -0700 9/13/99, Eugene Leitl wrote:
Why don't you just erase flash
Andreas Bogk wrote:
The usual setup for DPA involves a 10 Ohm resistor which sits in the
power supply and measuring the voltage across that resistor. The
countermeasure we're talking about is an on-chip capacitor that
smoothes the power consumption, [...]
Has this been analyzed? It's got to
At 02:58 PM 9/14/99 -0700, Eugene Leitl wrote:
You can't do differential power analysis if you supply power
photonically to an encapsulated unit.
Interesting. Such supplies have been proposed for medical gear, where you
need absolute isolation. Intense light, reflector,
Si cells. A few cm
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
[ To: Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 08/30/99 ##
Subject: Re: Power analysis of AES candidates ]
From: "William Whyte" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Cryptography@C2. Net" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Power analysis of AES candidates
Date: Wed,
John Kelsey writes:
There's some question about how hard it will be to design
hardware that will be DPA-resistant for different
algorithms.
Big on-chip caps. Lithium batteries. Tamper-resistant housings.
That's what Dallas Semiconductor uses for its 1-Wire devices,
including the famous
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