This effectively exempts things like signature-only smartcards and similar
tokens.
I would not want to risk things on strict technical interpretation.
I would go solely by intent, which often seems obvious.
"I don't know what cryptography is, but I know it when I see it."
/r$
At 07:39 AM 8/17/00 +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
My question was about the legal meaning, or, better, prevalent legal
interpretation, of "signature-only key". ...
This is not a purely academic issue. For example, in Hong Kong the import of
cryptographic devices is exempted from import
2000 16:40
To: Cryptography@C2. Net
Subject: Re: Using signature-only certs to authenticate key exchanges
Lucky (and Bill, in another message),
My question was about the legal meaning, or, better, prevalent legal
interpretation, of "signature-only key". I know how authenticated key
exch
PROTECTED]]On
Behalf Of Enzo Michelangeli
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2000 20:03
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Using signature-only certs to authenticate key exchanges
If I use a signature-only cert to authenticate a D-H key exchange
(e.g., in
IPSEC, or SSL with ephemeral DH ciphersu
"Cryptography@C2. Net" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2000 4:00 PM
Subject: RE: Using signature-only certs to authenticate key exchanges
Enzo,
Many applications that employ certs ignore key usage restrictions. This
isn't your fault or the fault of the CA. It simply re
If you ignore standards for the moment and think about
requirements and threat models, you need to do the following:
- protect against passive eavesdropping (so use crypto)
- exchange keys securely (so use Diffie-Hellmann)
- prevent man-in-the-middle attacks (so sign the DH parameters)
- only
If I use a signature-only cert to authenticate a D-H key exchange (e.g., in
IPSEC, or SSL with ephemeral DH ciphersuites) am I in violation of any
licensing condition and/or, when applicable, export regulation? I'm asking
because MS seems to suggest that for Win2K's IPSEC stack a signature-only
