Hi,
I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
[Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
to do this without a trusted third party is to pick an encryption
algorithm that will
mukti wrote:
> I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
> someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
The way I'd do this is to split up the encryption key with a shared
secret scheme, then give the shares to a number of trusted third
parties, wh
On Wed, Mar 08, 2000 at 05:05:24AM +0800, Arrianto Mukti Wibowo wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
> someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
>
> [Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
> t
In message <010601bf8879$2f4c1980$82d08489@muki>, "Arrianto Mukti Wibowo" write
s:
> Hi,
>
> I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
> someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
>
> [Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reason
At 5:05 AM +0800 3/8/2000, Arrianto Mukti Wibowo wrote:
>Hi,
>
>I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
>someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
>
>[Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
>to do this without a tr
At 05:05 3/8/2000 +0800, Arrianto Mukti Wibowo wrote:
>Hi,
>
>I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
>someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
>
>[Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
>to do this without a trus
One nice number-theoretic approach to the problem of preventing someone
(including the original sender) from decrypting a message before a
certain amount of time elapses can be found in the paper:
Time-lock puzzles and timed-release Crypto
by Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and David A. Wagn
; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: "Arrianto Mukti Wibowo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (bcc: Amir
Herzberg/Haifa/IBM)
Subject: time dependant
mukti wrote:
> I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't
allow
> someone to open an encrypted message b
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>I want to know whether there is a crypto building block which doesn't allow
>someone to open an encrypted message before a certain date.
>
>[Damn hard. Math functions don't grok "date". The only reasonable way
>to do this without a trusted third party is to pic
urity Technologies
> IBM Research Lab in Haifa (Tel Aviv Office)
> http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com
> New e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> New Lotus notes mail: amir herzberg/haifa/ibm@IBMIL
>
>
> Raph Levien <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on 08/03/2000 00:09:11
>
> Please respond to
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Matt Crawford" writes:
>
> If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
> copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
> CryptoTime, inc. not to publish the private key associated with date D
> before date D?
Th
> In the future, it may be possible to base something like this on
> physical principles. For example (and if I haven't dropped a decimal
> point), Jupiter is never closer than about 2079 light-seconds from
> Earth. A message encrypted with the public key of a satellite in that
> orbit could not
At 10:56 AM -0500 3/8/2000, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Matt Crawford" writes:
>>
>> If you're going to trust that CryptoSat, inc. hasn't stashed a local
>> copy of the private key, why not eliminate all that radio gear and trust
> > CryptoTime, inc. not to publish
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At 10:43 PM 3/9/00 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
[much deleted]
>In particular a satellite is pretty much subpoena proof.
>The subpoena threat is very real for CryptoTime, Inc.
>because courts tend to lean in favor of granting them, even
>if the underlying
At 12:55 AM -0600 3/10/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
>[much deleted]
>
>Actually, the subpoena threat means that we need to put the
>entities holding shares of the secret in places where even
>we can't find them. In the extreme case, there's some
>machine somewhere with e-mail access, which may carry
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At 05:08 PM 3/10/00 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>At 12:55 AM -0600 3/10/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
[stuff deleted]
>>>You may be right in practice, but it seems to me that a
>>>major goal of crypto research is to figure out how do do
>>>things in a way that
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, John Kelsey writes:
>
> Nor do I. But there's a related engineering question: Does
> it make sense to build large systems in which there's no way
> for humans to overrule the actions of programs once they're
> set in motion? *That* is the question I'm raising,
At 08:09 PM 3/10/00 -0600, John Kelsey wrote:
>But there's a related engineering question: Does
>it make sense to build large systems in which there's no way
>for humans to overrule the actions of programs once they're
>set in motion?
...
>To use a more common example, I believe there were some
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