Re: Permutation Steganography

At 6:34 PM + 6/3/03, Peter Hendrickson wrote: PStego.py is a module which can map between permutations and integers. Permutations, such as a shuffled deck of cards, can then be used to conceal and convey information. It's at: http://www.wiredyne.com/software/pstego.html. Just fyi, here's ano

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 10:09 AM 6/2/03 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > (One doesn't hear much about > crypto phones these days. Was this really a need?) As a minor aside - most laptops can manage pgpfone using only onboard hardware these days, either using an integrated modem or (via infrared) a mobile phone. --

Microsoft Ties Security to VeriSign, Certifications

www.internetnews.com/ent-news/article.php/2216571 Back to Article Microsoft Ties Security to VeriSign, Certifications By Thor Olavsrud and Mark Berniker June 3, 2003 Microsoft ( Quote ,Company Info ) moved to bolster its code-securi

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

"James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >I never figured out how to use a certificate to authenticate a client to a >web server, how to make a web form available to one client and not another. >Where do I start? There's a two-level answer to this problem. At an abstract level, doing client

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Bill Frantz wrote: > I know of one system that takes credit cards over HTTPS, and then > sends the credit card number, encrypted with GPG to a backend system > for processing. For that matter, our system here discards the CC after use (the pre-auth step with the merchant bank agent gives us back a

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Tim Dierks wrote: > > At 09:11 AM 6/3/2003, Peter Gutmann wrote: > >"Lucky Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >Given that SSL use is orders of magnitude higher than that of SSH, with no > > >change in sight, primarily due to SSL's ease-of-use, I am a bit puzzled by > > >your assertion that ssh

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Bill Stewart wrote: > > At 11:38 AM 06/03/2003 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > >I (arbitratrily) define the marketplace for SSL as browsing. > ... > >There, we can show statistics that indicate that SSL > >has penetrated to something slightly less than 1% of servers. > > For transmitting credit card nu

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

-- On 3 Jun 2003 at 15:04, James A. Donald wrote: > I never figured out how to use a certificate to authenticate > a client to a web server, how to make a web form available to > one client and not another. Where do I start? > > What I and everyone else does is use a shared secret, a > pass

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tue, 3 Jun 2003, John Kelsey wrote: > Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2003 10:42:01 -0400 > From: John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down > > ... > > I keep wondering how hard it would be to build a cordless phone system on > top of 802.11b with some kind of de

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tue, Jun 03, 2003 at 03:04:54PM -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > I never figured out how to use a certificate to authenticate a > client to a web server, how to make a web form available to one > client and not another. Where do I start? [ Resend to cryptography@ only coz the earlier attempt fa

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

some generic reasons for hooking radius (or one of the AAA technologies) into your webserver for authentication are: 1) supports a variety of authentication mechanisms on an account by account basis. day one, none of the users actually need to see any difference (single administrative interface

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

> I never figured out how to use a certificate to authenticate a > client to a web server, how to make a web form available to one > client and not another. Where do I start? You must not have looked very hard. :) I would start by taking Apache, openssl, and the mod_ssl package. For example, at

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tuesday, Jun 3, 2003, at 18:15 US/Eastern, Bill Frantz wrote: At 2:21 PM -0700 6/3/03, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: Perhaps that measure is too coarse grained. For instance, in the domain of "security advisories" most emails are digitally signed with OpenPGP. And in the domain of online cred

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 03:04 PM 6/3/2003 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: I never figured out how to use a certificate to authenticate a client to a web server, how to make a web form available to one client and not another. Where do I start? What I and everyone else does is use a shared secret, a password stored on th

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tue, Jun 03, 2003 at 06:17:12PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: > At 01:25 PM 6/3/03 -0700, Eric Blossom wrote: > ... > I agree end-to-end encryption is worthwhile if it's available, but even > when someone's calling my cellphone from a normal landline phone, I'd like > it if at least the over-the-

Analysis of TKIP from 802.11i

Tommorow afternoon I'll be unleashing a paper on the TKIP algorithm from 802.11i on my website. My attack breaks the algorithm in "theory" and cannot be used in practice just yet. Just want to get some attention to the paper. I've never really broken a fielded algorithm and I'd be grateful for f

Re: CDR: Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Sampo Syreeni wrote: > >But anything that goes over the air, whether cellphone or cordless phone, > >ought to be properly encrypted, and it isn't now. > > Why? As I see it, this is fundamentally an economic question, not a > technical one. It's about the risk of somebody listening in, taking noti

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

"James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > That's a red herring. It happens to use X.509 as its > > preferred bit-bagging format for public keys, but that's > > about it. People use self-signed certs, certs from unknown > > CAs [0], etc etc, and you don't need certs at all if you > > don'

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 2:21 PM -0700 6/3/03, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: >Perhaps that measure is too coarse grained. For instance, in the domain >of "security advisories" most emails are digitally signed with OpenPGP. >And in the domain of online credit card payments HTTPS has displaced >HTTP. I know of one system

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 01:25 PM 6/3/03 -0700, Eric Blossom wrote: ... Having spent many years messing with these things, I've come to the conclusion that what I personally want is a cell phone that implements good end-to-end crypto. This way, I've always got my secure communication device with me, there's no "bag on

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

-- > That's a red herring. It happens to use X.509 as its > preferred bit-bagging format for public keys, but that's > about it. People use self-signed certs, certs from unknown > CAs [0], etc etc, and you don't need certs at all if you > don't need them, I've just done an > RFC draft that u

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 11:38 AM 06/03/2003 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: I (arbitratrily) define the marketplace for SSL as browsing. ... There, we can show statistics that indicate that SSL has penetrated to something slightly less than 1% of servers. For transmitting credit card numbers on web forms, I'd be surprised if t

Re: New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

At 08:53 AM 06/03/2003 -0700, bear wrote: IDEA is still a good cipher as far as I know, but PGP has been driven away from it in the US due to intellectual-property issues. Rather than continue with incompatible versions for use inside/outside the USA, they're switching to CAST (although this is ca

Re: Nullsoft's WASTE communication system

The AP wire reports that the founder of Nullsoft, Justin Frankel, plans to resign in the wake of WASTE being pulled. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/technology/AP-AOL-Nullsoft.html --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me) http://www.wilyhacker.com

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tuesday, Jun 3, 2003, at 01:13 US/Eastern, Lucky Green wrote: Given that SSL use is orders of magnitude higher than that of SSH, with no change in sight, primarily due to SSL's ease-of-use, I am a bit puzzled by your assertion that ssh, not SSL, is the "only really successful net crypto system".

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tue, 2003-06-03 at 07:04, Peter Gutmann wrote: > That's a red herring. It happens to use X.509 as its preferred bit-bagging > format for public keys, but that's about it. People use self-signed certs, > certs from unknown CAs [0], etc etc, and you don't need certs at all if you > don't need th

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Tue, Jun 03, 2003 at 10:42:01AM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: > At 10:09 AM 6/2/03 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > ... > > (One doesn't hear much about > >crypto phones these days. Was this really a need?) Yes, I believe there is a need. In my view, there are two factors in the way of wide spread adopt

Re: CDR: Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On 2003-06-03, John Kelsey uttered to [EMAIL PROTECTED] and EKR: >I think phones that encrypt the landline part of the call are pretty >low-priority for most of us, since it costs something to eavesdrop on >these calls. I don't think the cost of listening into a single call is the primary issue,

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 7:42 AM -0700 6/3/03, John Kelsey wrote: >I keep wondering how hard it would be to build a cordless phone system on >top of 802.11b with some kind of decent encryption being used. I'd really >like to be able to move from a digital spread spectrum cordless phone >(which probably has a 16-bit key

Re: "PGP Encryption Proves Powerful"

At 08:17 AM 06/03/2003 -0700, bear wrote: what he said was "with cryptanalysis alone." Rubber-hose methods are not cryptanalysis, and neither is password guessing. Eh? Password guessing certainly is. >I'm not aware of a PGP port to the Psion, but at least the >Psion 3/3a/3c generation were 8086-l

Permutation Steganography

PStego.py is a module which can map between permutations and integers. Permutations, such as a shuffled deck of cards, can then be used to conceal and convey information. It's at: http://www.wiredyne.com/software/pstego.html. Peter

Re: New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

Much of this is in the PGP FAQ http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/pgpfaq.html At 01:58 PM 06/03/2003 +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I remember a time when PGP was a command line application. The only algorithms it used were IDEA (symmetric), RSA (assymetric) and MD5 (hash). I came to trust these algo

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 08:40 AM 06/03/2003 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: Eric Rescorla wrote: > > Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I don't think this is likely to be true. In my experience, > people who learn enough to design their own thing also learn > enough to be able to do SSL properly. True, although, that

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 10:09 AM 6/2/03 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: ... (One doesn't hear much about crypto phones these days. Was this really a need?) I think phones that encrypt the landline part of the call are pretty low-priority for most of us, since it costs something to eavesdrop on these calls. But anything th

Re: "PGP Encryption Proves Powerful"

At 11:18 AM 6/1/03 -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: ... This sounds workable in theory, but in practice, one has to work with the skills base of the users and the stress of the work. Terrorists are generally not adept at technical work. They are not really chosen for their skills; more their loyalty, thei

Re: New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

- Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 4:58 AM Subject: New vs Old (was Snake Oil) > > I confess to being confused - though admittedly part of the blame for this > is my own ignorance. > > I remember a time when PGP was a comm

What is currently recommended? (New v Old)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > I confess to being confused - though admittedly part of the blame for this > is my own ignorance. > I'll second that. I've been considering a new release of Photuris, in honor of its upcoming 10th anniversary, and was wondering what should be the "best" defaults?

Re: New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

On Tue, 3 Jun 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > >I confess to being confused - though admittedly part of the blame for this >is my own ignorance. > >I remember a time when PGP was a command line application. The only >algorithms it used were IDEA (symmetric), RSA (assymetric) and MD5 (hash). I >ca

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Lucky Green wrote: > > Ian Grigg wrote: > > Also, a lot of cryptosystems are put together > > by committees. SSH was originally put together > > by one guy. He did the lot. Allegedly, a fairly > > grotty protocol with a number of weakneses, but > > it was there and up and running. And SSH-2 is

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Eric Rescorla wrote: > True, although, that begs the question as > to how they learn. Only by doing, I'd say. > I think one learns a lot more from making > mistakes and building ones own attempt than > following the words of wise. One learns by *practicing*.

RE: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

At 09:11 AM 6/3/2003, Peter Gutmann wrote: "Lucky Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >Given that SSL use is orders of magnitude higher than that of SSH, with no >change in sight, primarily due to SSL's ease-of-use, I am a bit puzzled by >your assertion that ssh, not SSL, is the "only really success

Re: New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

On Tue, 3 Jun 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > So, could someone please tell me: > > (1) What is the justification for using these "new" algorithms instead of > the old ones? (A cynic might suggest that, since the "powers that be" > couldn't break the old algorithms, they encouraged the use of ne

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Ian Grigg wrote: It's like the GSM story, whereby 8 years down the track, Lucky Green cracked the crypto by probing the SIMs to extract the secret algorithm over a period of many months (which algorithm then fell to Ian Goldberg and Dave Wagner in a few hours). In that case, some GSM guy said that

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

On Wed, Jun 04, 2003 at 01:11:51AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: | "Lucky Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: | | >I trust that we can agree that the volume of traffic and number of | >transactions protected by SSL are orders of magnitude higher than those | >protected by SSH. As is the number of use

RE: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

"Lucky Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >I trust that we can agree that the volume of traffic and number of >transactions protected by SSL are orders of magnitude higher than those >protected by SSH. As is the number of users of SSL. The overwhelming majority >of which wouldn't know ssh from tel

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >It's also very much oriented to x.509 and similar certificate/PKI models, >which means it is difficult to use in web of trust (I know this because we >started on the path of adding web of trust and text signing features to x.509 >before going back to OpenPGP)

New vs Old (was Snake Oil)

I confess to being confused - though admittedly part of the blame for this is my own ignorance. I remember a time when PGP was a command line application. The only algorithms it used were IDEA (symmetric), RSA (assymetric) and MD5 (hash). I came to trust these algorithms. Now these once-'standar

Ntru suffers 'chosen ciphertext attack'

Ntru gets into trouble when their proprietary crypto hits a security bug... "The technology was perceived to be better, but it's not good enough to overcome the objection that no one gets fired for buying RSA [Security Inc.products]," said one person close to Ntru. :-) Apropos to the

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

Eric Rescorla wrote: > > Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > Eric Murray wrote: > > It may be that the SSL underlying code is > > perfect. But that the application is weak > > because the implementor didn't understand > > how to drive it; in which case, if he can > > roll his own, he may e