Bill Frantz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The real problem is that the viewer software, whether it is an editor, PDF
viewer, or a computer language interpreter, runs with ALL the user's
privileges. If we ran these programs with a minimum of privilege, most of
the problems would just go away.
This
EKR writes:
I'm trying to figure out why you want to invent a new authentication
protocol rather than just going back to the literature ...
there's another rationale my clients often give for
wanting a new security system, instead of the off-
the-shelf standbys: IPSec, SSL, Kerberos, and the
Don Davis [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
EKR writes:
I'm trying to figure out why you want to invent a new authentication
protocol rather than just going back to the literature ...
there's another rationale my clients often give for
wanting a new security system, instead of the off-
I could do an implementation of SSL. Speaking as a programmer with an
interest in crypto, I'm fairly sure I could produce a cleanly
implemented and simple-to-use version.
I confess I didn't realise there was a need. You see, it's not that it
doesn't seem to excite [me] - it's just that, well,
Who on this list just wrote a report on the dangers of Monoculture?
An implementation monoculture is more dangerous than a protocol
monoculture..
Most exploitable security problems arise from implementation errors,
rather than from inherent flaws in the protocol being implemented.
And broad
On 10/01/2003 11:22 AM, Don Davis wrote:
there's another rationale my clients often give for
wanting a new security system, instead of the off-
the-shelf standbys: IPSec, SSL, Kerberos, and the
XML security specs are seen as too heavyweight for
some applications. the developer doesn't want
Guus Sliepen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Compared with the entire TLS protocol it is much simpler, compared with
just the handshake protocol it is about as simple and probably just as
efficient, but as I said earlier, I want to get rid of the client/server
distinction.
You can't get rid of the
Matt Blaze wrote:
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys?
Rich,
Oh come on. Are you willfully misinterpreting what I
Jill Ramonsky wrote:
Is it possible for Bob to instruct his browser to (a) refuse to trust
anything signed by Eve, and (b) to trust Alice's certificate (which
she handed to him personally)? (And if so, how?)
I am very much hoping that you can answer both (a) and (b) with a yes,
ok then yes :)
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 04:48:33PM +0100, Jill Ramonsky wrote:
But I would like to ask you to clarify something about SSL which has
been bugging me. Allow me to present a scenario. Suppose:
(1) Alice runs a web server.
(2) Bob has a web client.
(3) Alice and Bob know each other personally,
Don Davis wrote:
EKR writes:
I'm trying to figure out why you want to invent a new authentication
protocol rather than just going back to the literature ...
note that customers aren't usually dissatisfied with
the crypto protocols per se; they just want the
protocol's implementation to
eric wrote:
The way I see it, there are basically four options:
(1) Use OpenSSL (or whatever) as-is.
(2) Strip down your toolkit but keep using SSL.
(3) Write your own toolkit that implements a
stripped down subset of SSL (e.g. self-signed
certs or anonymous DH).
(4) Design your own
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 04:48:33PM +0100, Jill Ramonsky wrote:
I could do an implementation of SSL. Speaking as a programmer with an
interest in crypto, I'm fairly sure I could produce a cleanly
implemented and simple-to-use version.
Yep. It's a bit of work, and more work to ensure that
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
This is where maybe the guild and the outside world part
ways.
The guild would like the application builder to learn the
field. They would like him to read up on all the literature,
the analysies. To emulate the successes and avoid the
pitfalls of
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
...
Dumb cryptography kills people.
What's your threat model? Or, that's your threat
model?
Applying the above threat model as written up in
The Codebreakers to, for example, SSL and its
original credit card nreeds would seem to be a
mismatch.
On the face of it,
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 02:34:23PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
Don Davis wrote:
note that customers aren't usually dissatisfied with
the crypto protocols per se; they just want the
protocol's implementation to meet their needs exactly,
without extra baggage of flexibility, configuration
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
...
Dumb cryptography kills people.
What's your threat model? Or, that's your threat
model?
Applying the above threat model as written up in
The Codebreakers to, for example, SSL and its
original credit card nreeds would
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 02:24:00PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
Matt Blaze wrote:
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys?
On Wed, 1 Oct 2003, Peter Gutmann wrote:
This doens't really work. Consider the simple case where you run Outlook with
'nobody' privs rather than the current user privs. You need to be able to
send and receive mail, so a worm that mails itself to others won't be slowed
down much. In addition
Guus Sliepen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
You clearly formulated what we are doing! We want to keep our crypto as
simple and to the point as necessary for tinc. We also want to
understand it ourselves.
There is nothing wrong with either goal.
Implementing our own authentication protocol helps
On Wed, 1 Oct 2003, John S. Denker wrote:
According to 'ps', an all-up ssh system is less
than 3 megabytes (sshd, ssh-agent, and the ssh
client). At current memory prices, your clients
would save less than $1.50 per system even if
their custom software could reduce this bulk
to zero.
That's
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 10:20:53PM +0200, Guus Sliepen wrote:
You clearly formulated what we are doing! We want to keep our crypto as
simple and to the point as necessary for tinc. We also want to
understand it ourselves. Implementing our own authentication protocol
helps us do all that.
http://msnbc-cnet.com.com/2102-1029_3-5083772.html?tag=3Dni_print
VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting=20
By Robert Lemos=20
Staff Writer, CNET News.com=20
http://news.com.com/2100-1029-5083772.html=20
VeriSign announced Monday that it will provide key components of a system d=
esigned to
Ronald L. Rivest [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
What is aperture minimization? That's a new term for me...
Never heard of it before. Google has never seen it either...
(Perhaps others on the list would be curious as well...)
I'm sure you have heard of it, just under other names.
The term
Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Wed, Oct 01, 2003 at 08:53:39AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
there's another rationale my clients often give for
wanting a new security system [existing protcools] too heavyweight for
some applications.
I hear this a lot, but I think that Perry
Don Davis [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
eric wrote:
The way I see it, there are basically four options:
(1) Use OpenSSL (or whatever) as-is.
(2) Strip down your toolkit but keep using SSL.
(3) Write your own toolkit that implements a
stripped down subset of SSL (e.g. self-signed
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise
their right to vote, said George Schu, a vice president at VeriSign. The
sanctity of the vote can't be compromised nor
Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks? If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would,
and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse without MITM protection so
I cannot imagine it would be acceptable practice without some form of
M Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks? If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would,
and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse without MITM protection so
I cannot imagine it would be
At 07:06 PM 10/1/2003, M Taylor wrote:
Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks? If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would,
and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse without MITM protection so
I cannot imagine it would be acceptable
M Taylor wrote:
Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks? If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would,
Ah, there's the rub. ADH does not protect against
MITM, as far as I am aware.
and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse
Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise
their right to vote, said George Schu, a vice president at VeriSign. The
sanctity of
On Thu, Oct 02, 2003 at 12:06:40AM +0100, M Taylor wrote:
Stupid question I'm sure, but does TLS's anonymous DH protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks?
No, it doesn't.
If so, how? I cannot figure out how it would,
and it would seem TLS would be wide open to abuse without MITM protection
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 19:53, Ian Grigg wrote:
Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise
their right to vote, said George
John S. Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
According to 'ps', an all-up ssh system is less than 3 megabytes (sshd, ssh-
agent, and the ssh client). At current memory prices, your clients would
save less than $1.50 per system even if their custom software could reduce
this bulk to zero.
Let me
Tim Dierks [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It does not, and most SSL/TLS implementations/installations do not support
anonymous DH in order to avoid this attack.
Uhh, I think that implementations don't support DH because the de facto
standard is RSA, not because of any concern about MITM (see below).
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E. Metzger writes:
Unfortunately, those parts are rather dangerous to omit.
0) If you omit the message authenticator, you will now be subject to a
range of fine and well documented cut and paste attacks. With some
ciphers, especially stream ciphers,
At 10:37 PM 10/1/2003, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Tim Dierks [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It does not, and most SSL/TLS implementations/installations do not support
anonymous DH in order to avoid this attack.
Uhh, I think that implementations don't support DH because the de facto
standard is RSA, not
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