Indian National Workshop on Cryptography

? Tuesday, October 14, 2003 Cyber India Online National workshop on cryptography PUNE: Cryptography was until recently an exclusive domain of the defense and security agencies. However, with the explosive growth of computerization, networki

Re: NCipher Takes Hardware Security To Network Level

- Original Message - From: "Ian Grigg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > * In contrast, someone who knows little about cars, > can objectively evaluate a car. They can take it > for a test drive and see if it feels right. Using > it is proving it. I'm not totally convinced of this... Someone wit

Re: Internal format of RSA private keys in microsoft keystore.

- Original Message - From: "R.Sriram" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, October 10, 2003 1:20 AM Subject: Internal format of RSA private keys in microsoft keystore. > Greetings, > > In the process of trying to work around some of the limitations > of the m$-CAPI

Re: WYTM?

On Mon, Oct 13, 2003 at 06:49:30PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > Yet others say "to be sure we are talking > to the merchant." Sorry, that's not a good > answer either because in my email box today > there are about 10 different attacks on the > secure sites that I care about. And mostly, > they don'

Re: WYTM?

Ian Grigg wrote: Cryptography is a special product, it may appear to be working, but that isn't really good enough. Coincidence would lead us to believe that clear text or ROT13 were good enough, in the absence of any attackers. For this reason, we have a process. If the process is not followed,

Re: cryptographic ergodic sequence generators?

Perry E. Metzger wrote: >>I've noted to others on this before that for an application like >>the IP fragmentation id, it might be even better if no repeats >>occurred in any block of 2^31 (n being 32) but the sequence did not >>repeat itself (or at least could be harmlessly reseeded at very very >

Re: WYTM?

Tim Dierks wrote: > > At 12:28 AM 10/13/2003, Ian Grigg wrote: > >Problem is, it's also wrong. The end systems > >are not secure, and the comms in the middle is > >actually remarkably safe. > > I think this is an interesting, insightful analysis, but I also think it's > drawing a stronger contra

Re: WYTM?

Eric Rescorla wrote: > > Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > I'm sorry, but, yes, I do find great difficulty > > in not dismissing it. Indeed being other than > > dismissive about it! > > > > Cryptography is a special product, it may > > appear to be working, but that isn't really > > good