Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: > Trei, Peter wrote: > >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an > >unneccesary complication. > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather di

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

Brian McGroarty wrote: On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote: It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes rather directly with the requirement to protect voters from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particu

See-Through Voting Software

Wired News See-Through Voting Software By Kim Zetter 02:00 AM Apr. 08, 2004 PT VoteHere, an electronic voting systems company, released its source code this week in a bid to let others examine how the machines work and help people gain c

Re: voting

a counterpoint... "Perry E. Metzger" wrote: > > I'm a believer in the KISS principle. :-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough. > A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by > machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you > ver

Re: voting

At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote: "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens the way for serial voting fraud. The receipt should be exposed to the vot

Re: voting

Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks: * Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that missing or added ballots can be detected. * Put check digits on each ballot, so that alte

Re: voting

At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote: >In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties >running. The casual reference above to representatives "on each >side" betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide >representatives as easily

Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software

> Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400 > From: Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote > verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes > rather directly with the requirement to protect voters > from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a p

eCompute ECC2-109 Project has PROBABLE solution

http://www.ecompute.org/ecc2/ There has been a PROBABLE solution generated as of 1425 hrs GMT, April 8, 2004. Until Certicom has confirmed this, it will be treated as a PROBABLE solution and the DP collection will continue. The two people who have submitted the DP values have been emailed. Unt

RE: voting

"privacy" wrote: [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] > It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded > and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, > error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic

voting, KISS, etc.

I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure voting security miss the point entirely. They start with the assumption that something is "broken" about the current voting system. I contend it is just fine. For example, it takes a long time to count pieces of papers compared w

Re: voting, KISS, etc.

On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure > voting security miss the point entirely. [...] > I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a > security professional, and I love a good crypt

RE: voting

| "privacy" wrote: | [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] | | > It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded | > and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, | > error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptog

Re: voting

Perry E. Metzger wrote: > Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are > simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard. I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there, of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options, your prop