Email end-to-end: PGP, PGP/MIME, S/MIME. Not tunnel SSL or SSL
at the end points.
Lars Eilebrecht wrote:
According to Ed Gerck:
But encryption and authentication are a hassle today, with less
than 2% of all email encrypted (sorry, can't cite the source I know).
Are these 2% 'only' S/MIME and
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
2 centsIn the business cases pointed out where it is good that the multiple
parties hold the private key, I feel the certificate should indicate that
there are multiple parties so that Bob can realize he is having authenticated
and private communications with Alice _and_
For those who haven't seen the announcement:
-- Snip --
July 27, 2004 -- NIST has determined that the strength of the (single) Data
Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is no longer sufficient to adequately
protect Federal government information. As a result, NIST proposes
withdrawing FIPS 46-3,
Hi Adam,
The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there
should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are
discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA
is up-to-no-good. Ie the difference is it is detectable and provable.
As far as I
--- begin forwarded text
From: ECC 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: ECC 04 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: ECC 2004
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 18:15:49 +0200
=
