I'm wondering how applicable RPOW is. Generally speaking, all
the practical applications I can think of for a proof-of-work
are defeated if proofs-of-work are storable, transferable, or
reusable.
I have some code to play online games with cryptographic protection,
cards and dice,
and I am plannin
Another of the Crypto talks that was relevant to hash function security
was by Antoine Joux, discoverer of the SHA-0 collision that required
2^51 work. Joux showed how most modern hash functions depart from the
ideal of a random function.
The problem is with the iterative nature of most hash func
More on the question of HMAC. As mentioned before, the potential attack
would be to find a collision on the inner hash, even without knowing the
key. Since the key is exactly one hash block in length, the effect is
identical to finding a hash collision without knowing the IV.
Discussing this iss
Greg,
> And the reason you haven't heard any progress from Dobbertin is because his
> employers told him to either stop working on it, or stop talking about it,
> depending which version of the story you've heard. Since he works for the
> German NSA-equivalent, I guess he would take this seriou
*
DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security
November 3 - 4, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Bill Arbaugh, University of Maryland, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Presented under th
Bear writes:
> I'm wondering how applicable RPOW is. Generally speaking, all
> the practical applications I can think of for a proof-of-work
> are defeated if proofs-of-work are storable, transferable, or
> reusable. Once they're storable, tranferable, and reusable,
> aren't we restricted to appl
