-- Forwarded message --
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 01:49:26 + (UTC)
From: Jason Holt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1
Per the recent discussion regarding tor and wikipedia, I've hacked together an
implementation of the basic syst
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Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2005 14:40:08 -0400
To: Philodox Clips List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "R.A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [Clips] Controversial security chip goes mobile
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Trevor Perrin wrote:
> One pragmatic issue is that it would be nice if you could form
> "continuity of identity" bindings to existing 3rd-party-managed
> identities as well as self-managed identities. If the client records an
> identity as something like (CA cert, domain name), then this identity
http://cryptome.org/nsa-6947978.htm
Method for geolocating logical network addresses
Abstract
Method for geolocating logical network addresses on electronically
switched dynamic communications networks, such as the Internet,
using the time latency of communications to and fr
Hi John,
John Denker wrote:
[...]
For starters, let me suggest that rather than having a self-signed
certificate of the type created more-or-less automatically when
you set up your Apache server or set up your SSH daemon, it makes
more sense to set up your own CA and issue your own certs from
t
| >
| >Talking about users as being able only to hold one bit continues an
| >unfortunate attitude that, if only users weren't so dumb/careless/whatever,
| >we wouldn't have all these security problems.
|
| This is an important point.
In November, 2003, the Computing Research Association
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
This is an important point. When *many* people are doing the "wrong"
thing, the problem isn't the people, it's the mechanism they're being
asked to use.
Once we have a better solution to the problem, I'll agree. But in the
meantime, I'd say the
