Hal Finney wrote:
it is mentioned that if a broadcast transaction does not reach all nodes,
it is OK, as it will get into the block chain before long. How does this
happen - what if the node that creates the next block (the first node
to find the hashcash collision) did not hear about the
--
Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
The proof-of-work chain is the solution to the
synchronisation problem, and to knowing what the
globally shared view is without having to trust
anyone.
A transaction will quickly propagate throughout the
network, so if two versions of the same transaction
Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
or which ones signed?
Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
Increasing hardware speed is handled: To compensate
for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in
running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty
is determined by a moving average targeting an average
number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too
James A. Donald wrote:
OK, suppose one node incorporates a bunch of
transactions in its proof of work, all of them honest
legitimate single spends and another node incorporates a
different bunch of transactions in its proof of
work, all of them equally honest legitimate single
spends, and both
James A. Donald wrote:
The core concept is that lots of entities keep complete and consistent
information as to who owns which bitcoins.
But maintaining consistency is tricky. It is not clear to me what
happens when someone reports one transaction to one maintainer, and
someone else
Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
The bandwidth might not be as prohibitive as you
think. A typical transaction would be about 400 bytes
(ECC is nicely compact). Each transaction has to be
broadcast twice, so lets say 1KB per transaction.
Visa processed 37 billion transactions in FY2008, or
an
