Re: MD5 considered harmful today

2009-01-02 Thread Len Sassaman
On Tue, 30 Dec 2008, Hal Finney wrote: > > - The attack relies on cryptographic advances in the state of the art for >finding MD5 collisions from inputs with different prefixes. These advances >are not yet being published but will presumably appear in 2009. To insert a malicious "basicCon

Re: A History of U.S. Communications Security

2009-01-02 Thread Marcus Brinkmann
Pehr Söderman wrote: > Freshly declassified and a rather interesting read: > > A History of U.S. Communications Security (Volumes I and II, 1973) > David G. Boak Lectures, National Security Agency (NSA) > > http://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdf > > (From Bruce Sch

Re: Security by asking the drunk whether he's drunk

2009-01-02 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 10:19 PM -0500 12/30/08, Jerry Leichter wrote: >Robert Graham writes in Errata Security >(http://erratasec.blogspot.com/2008/12/not-all-md5-certs-are-vulnerable.html) >that the attack depends on being able to predict the serial number field that >will be assigned to a legitimate certificate b