On Thu, 20 Oct 2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
system without excessive complications. Only the fifth point, the
ability for outsiders to monitor the amount of cash in circulation, is
not satisfied. But even then, the ecash mint software, and procedures
and controls followed by the issuer, could be des
On Sat, 9 Jul 2005, [UNKNOWN] Jörn Schmidt wrote:
less attractive to commit credit card fraud. You are, however, not
making it harder. That's why I believe the credit cards companies will
indeed have a good, long look at smartcards. Probably not tomorrow or
next week but in the near future.
On Thu, 23 Jun 2005, Beryllium Sphere LLC wrote:
Can you destroy the relationship between key contents and timing without
hurting average run time?
Each round of AES has sixteen table lookups. If you permute the order in which
the implementation does the lookups, then you get a completely
Back in Fall 2003, David Wagner and I were looking at the FasTrak
transponders used in the San Francisco Bay Area. We were more interested
in the privacy aspects than in security, but we found some basic
information that may be of interest given the current discussion about
EZPass issues.
* FasTr
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> another purpose -- preserving the privacy of drivers by using more
> complicated protocols. However, as the benefit of such systems is to
> people who are unlikely to have much voice in the construction of the
> system, and who are also unlikely to
