MITM attacks

2003-10-22 Thread l . crypto
Take many grains of salt before concluding that MITM attacks are either hard or don't happen. It is just that the environment for them is not the Internet per se, but modern switched LANs. The basic trick to monitoring someone's LAN traffic is to convince the ARP machinery that the MITM MAC is a

Re: Are there...

2003-11-17 Thread l . crypto
(this is a resend, apologies for duplicates) As David Wagner points out, encryption with a public key (for which the private key has been discarded) would seem to work. I think there is a bit more to be said about requirements though. For a one-way encryption algorithm to be injective will also

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread l . crypto
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks: * Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that missing or added ballots can be detected. * Put check digits on each ballot, so that alte

Re: The future of security

2004-05-25 Thread l . crypto
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Would anyone there have any good predictions on how > cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years > or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love > to see what others see in the crystal ball. > I'd like to think we would see a new flowering of c