Re: Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?

On Sun, Aug 1, 2010 at 7:10 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > ...does anyone know of any significant use [of split keys] by > J.Random luser?  I'm interested in this from a usability point > of view. > Maybe not J.Random but J.Corporate... A few jobs ago back in the late '90s, I worked for Network Assoc

Re: 2048-bit RSA keys

On Tue, Aug 17, 2010 at 1:46 AM, Joseph Ashwood wrote: > > The storage required for 2048 is approximately 2^64 bytes... > And from the density (1TB per cubic inch) in US Patent Application 20090094406, that gives about 70,000 gallons of memory or about 14 of my father-in-law's average sized backya

Verizon Business RISK data crime–investigation tea m's 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report

I haven't read the report , except for the executive summary at the end of the pdf and another summary here . Note

Lasers crack commercial encryption systems

From: Quantum hackers have performed the first 'invisible' attack on two commercial quantum cryptographic systems...they have fully cracked their encryption keys, yet left no trace of the hack..."Our hack gave 100% knowledge

Re: Merkle Signature Scheme is the most secure signature scheme possible for general-purpose use

On Fri, Sep 3, 2010 at 10:29 AM, Jack Lloyd wrote: > On Fri, Sep 03, 2010 at 09:45:20AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: > > ...narrow-pipe designs have a huge null space for messages > which are exactly as big as the compression function input > size. For instance hashing inputs that are multiples of 512

Re: CPRNGs are still an issue.

On Thu, Dec 11, 2008 at 8:42 PM, Damien Miller wrote: > On Thu, 11 Dec 2008, James A. Donald wrote: > >> If one uses a higher resolution counter - sub >> microsecond - and times multiple disk accesses, one gets >> true physical randomness, since disk access times are >> effected by turbulence, whi

security fail (from failblog)

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Re: Fast MAC algorithms?

On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 1:43 AM, Nicolas Williams wrote: > > But that's not what I'm looking for here.  I'm looking for the fastest > MACs, with extreme security considerations...In the crypto world > one never designs weak-but-fast algorithms on purpose, only > strong-and-preferably-fast ones.  An

Re: Fast MAC algorithms?

On Thu, Jul 23, 2009 at 1:34 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > "mhey...@gmail.com" writes: > >>2) If you throw TCP processing in there, unless you are consistantly going to >>have packets on the order of at least 1000 bytes, your crypto algorithm is >>almost _irrelev

Hacker Says iPhone 3GS Encryption Is ‘Useless’ f or Businesses

>From : the supposedly enterprise-friendly encryption included with the iPhone 3GS is so weak it can be cracked in two minutes with a few pieces of readily available freeware...“I don’t think any of us [developers] have ever seen

Re: Malware using good crypto

On Sat, Aug 1, 2009 at 11:52 PM, Udhay Shankar N wrote: > Interesting article. Anyone here have experience trying to > reverse-engineer malware that uses really good crypto? > I haven't done this personally but I have worked with people who do. Typically, the type of encryption isn't that important

AES in stick figures

A Stick Figure Guide to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (A play in 4 acts) -Michael Heyman - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "uns