[Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)

2013-09-13 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 08:08:38 +0200 Eugen Leitl wrote: > Why e.g. SWIFT is not running on one time pads is beyond me. I strongly suspect that delivering them securely to the vast number of endpoints involved and then securing the endpoints as well would radically limit the usefulness. Note that it

Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)

2013-09-14 Thread John Kelsey
On Sep 13, 2013, at 3:23 PM, "Perry E. Metzger" wrote: > The problem these days is not that something like AES is not good > enough for our purposes. The problem is that we too often build a > reinforced steel door in a paper wall. Also, if AES being insufficiently strong is our problem, we have

Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)

2013-09-14 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:23 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > I strongly suspect that delivering them securely to the vast number > of endpoints involved and then securing the endpoints as well would > radically limit the usefulness. Note that it appears that even the > NSA generally prefers to comp

Re: [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)

2013-09-15 Thread Dirk-Willem van Gulik
Op 13 sep. 2013, om 21:23 heeft Perry E. Metzger het volgende geschreven: > On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 08:08:38 +0200 Eugen Leitl > wrote: >> Why e.g. SWIFT is not running on one time pads is beyond me. > > I strongly suspect that delivering them securely to the vast number > of endpoints involved a