Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-15 Thread R.A. Hettinga
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/cryptography_research/print.html> The Register Biting the hand that feeds IT The Register » Internet and Law » Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs » Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs By Faultline (peter at rethinkresear

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread Ian Grigg
> What CR does instead is much simpler and more direct. It tries to cut off > any player that has been used for mass piracy. Let me get this right. ... > "When a pirate makes a copy of a film encoded as SPDC, the output file is > cryptographically bound to a set of player decryption keys. So it i

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread Taral
On Wed, Dec 15, 2004 at 09:29:46AM -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > The virtual machine players create movie outputs that are artistically > identical but each one is altered if some minor way. This alteration is > just the changing of a few bits of data every few seconds, so every 50 > frames or so.

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread Matt Crawford
On Dec 15, 2004, at 11:54, Taral wrote: What stops someone using 3 players and majority voting on frame data bits? As I understand it, they use such a huge number of bits for marking, that any reasonably-sized assembly of players will still coincide on some marked bits. (However, I very much doub

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread John Kelsey
>From: Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: Dec 15, 2004 12:08 PM >To: cryptography@metzdowd.com >Subject: Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs ... >A blockbuster worth $100m gets cracked ... and >the crack gets watermarked with the Id of the >

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread Taral
On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 10:58:11AM -0600, Matt Crawford wrote: > > On Dec 15, 2004, at 11:54, Taral wrote: > > >What stops someone using 3 players and majority voting on frame data > >bits? > > As I understand it, they use such a huge number of bits for marking, > that any reasonably-sized asse

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-04 Thread Adam Back
>From what I recall from reading the CR paper a while back they can tolerate up to some threshold of colluding players. However if you go over that threshold (and it's not too large) you can remove the mark. I would think the simplest canonical counter-attack would be to make a p2p app that compa

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-04 Thread Bill Stewart
At 09:08 AM 12/15/2004, Ian Grigg wrote: Let me get this right. ... ... A blockbuster worth $100m gets cracked ... and the crack gets watermarked with the Id of the $100 machine that played it. ... So the solution is to punish the $100 machine by asking them to call Disney with a CC in hand? If you

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-04 Thread Ariel Waissbein
Is there really that much space for marking? Any substantial number of marked bits will become obvious in the output stream, no? Is the watermarking system robust? Is it public? And how long ago has it been published? If they are only modifying some bits (in the standard representation), then on

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-04 Thread Ian G
Bill Stewart wrote: At 09:08 AM 12/15/2004, Ian Grigg wrote: Let me get this right. ... ... A blockbuster worth $100m gets cracked ... and the crack gets watermarked with the Id of the $100 machine that played it. ... So the solution is to punish the $100 machine by asking them to call Disney with

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-04 Thread Ian G
To add a postscript to that, yesterday's LAWgram reported that $10 DVD *players* are now selling in the US. The economics of player-id-watermarking are looking a little wobbly; we can now buy a throwaway player for the same price as a throwaway disk. http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=20371 iang

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-05 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >To add a postscript to that, yesterday's LAWgram >reported that $10 DVD *players* are now selling >in the US. I heard from a friend of mine who works for an organisation that deals with China a fair bit that the DVD licensing costs make up the majority of the

RE: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-05 Thread Marcel Popescu
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Adam Back > Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 11:48 PM > I would think the simplest canonical counter-attack would be to make a > p2p app that compares diffs in the binary output (efficiently rsync > style) accumulates enou

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-05 Thread Ian G
Adam Back wrote: From what I recall from reading the CR paper a while back they can tolerate up to some threshold of colluding players. However if you go over that threshold (and it's not too large) you can remove the mark. I would think the simplest canonical counter-attack would be to make a p2p

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-05 Thread Jerrold Leichter
| To add a postscript to that, yesterday's LAWgram | reported that $10 DVD *players* are now selling | in the US. The economics of player-id-watermarking | are looking a little wobbly; we can now buy | a throwaway player for the same price as a | throwaway disk. | | http://www.theinquirer.net/?a

RE: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2005-01-05 Thread Bill Frantz
On 1/5/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Marcel Popescu) wrote: >Why not the way it happens right now - re-encoding? Few people post DVD >images of movies on p2p networks, and even when they do, I prefer a DivX or >XviD variant. (Much better given my 'net bandwidth.) I strongly doubt >there's any chance of a