Re: Unforgeable dialog.

2006-02-09 Thread Peter Gutmann
James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: 2. Html encourages legitimate businesses to use complicated and obfuscated actual targets for their urls, indistinguishable from those used by phishers. I think a more general extension of this is HTML allows the use of arbitrarily sophisticated

Re: Unforgeable dialog.

2006-02-03 Thread Travis H.
In one environment I worked in, it was important that people know what kind of data they were looking at. The way they solved it was to put a green colored border and label on one kind of data, and a red border and different label on another kind of data. This reduces usable screen area a bit,

Re: Unforgeable dialog.

2006-02-03 Thread Alex Iliev
James A. Donald wrote: -- One needs to differentiate dialogs brought up from within the browser client, which are trustworthy unless one is infected with malware, from popups brought up by some other web page. (Of course if popups are disabled except for specific sites, this is

Re: Unforgeable dialog.

2006-02-03 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
That is a nice trick, but that still may not work entirely: if i make sure my untrusted app always opens in maximized mode, the untrusted decoration (in your case a big black border which actually _disappears_) may be unnoticed along the edges of the screen; if my app then simulates the whole

RE: Unforgeable dialog.

2006-02-02 Thread Bowness, Piers
This is concept is surprisingly complex. Once the attacker sees the secure dialog, what prevents them from using the same techniques and/or code to create a visually identical spoof? There have been several OS-level designs to create hardware-supported secure dialogs. Needless to say, these