Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2006-01-06 Thread Ben Laurie
Bill Frantz wrote: On 12/24/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ben Laurie) wrote: I don't see why not - the technical details actually matter. Since the servers will all share a socket, on any normal architecture, they'll all have access to everyone's private keys. So, what is gained by having separate

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-27 Thread Ian G
Ben Laurie wrote: Ian G wrote: ... http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/VhostTaskForce (The big problem of course is that you can use one cert to describe many domains only if they are the same administrative entity.) If they share an IP address (which they must, otherwise there's no problem),

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-27 Thread Ben Laurie
Eric Rescorla wrote: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: And we need SSL v2 to die so it doesn't interfere with the above. Actually, you just disable it in the server. I don't see why we need anything more than that. The problem is that the ServerHostName extension that signals which

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-27 Thread Ben Laurie
Ian G wrote: Ben Laurie wrote: Ian G wrote: ... http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/VhostTaskForce (The big problem of course is that you can use one cert to describe many domains only if they are the same administrative entity.) If they share an IP address (which they must, otherwise there's

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-27 Thread Ian G
Ben Laurie wrote: Ian G wrote: http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/VhostTaskForce (The big problem of course is that you can use one cert to describe many domains only if they are the same administrative entity.) If they share an IP address (which they must, otherwise there's no problem), then

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-24 Thread Ben Laurie
Ian G wrote: BTW, illustrating points made here, the cert is for financialcryptography.com but your link was to www.financialcryptography.com. So of course Firefox generated a warning Indeed and even if that gets fixed we still have to contend with: * the blog software

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-24 Thread Ian G
Ben Laurie wrote: ... Hopefully over the next year, the webserver (Apache) will be capable of doing the TLS extension for sharing certs so then it will be reasonable to upgrade. In fact, I'm told (I'll dig up the reference) that there's an X509v3 extension that allows you to specify alternate

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-24 Thread Ben Laurie
Ian G wrote: Ben Laurie wrote: ... Hopefully over the next year, the webserver (Apache) will be capable of doing the TLS extension for sharing certs so then it will be reasonable to upgrade. In fact, I'm told (I'll dig up the reference) that there's an X509v3 extension that allows you to

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-24 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Ben Laurie wrote: If they share an IP address (which they must, otherwise there's no problem), then they must share a webserver, which means they can share a cert, surely? this is a semantic nit ... certs are typically distributed openly and freely ... so potentially everybody in the world has

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-24 Thread Eric Rescorla
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Ian G wrote: Ben Laurie wrote: ... Hopefully over the next year, the webserver (Apache) will be capable of doing the TLS extension for sharing certs so then it will be reasonable to upgrade. In fact, I'm told (I'll dig up the reference) that there's

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-23 Thread leichter_jerrold
| | But is what they are doing wrong? | | | | The users? No, not really, in that given the extensive conditioning that | | they've been subject to, they're doing the logical thing, which is not paying | | any attention to certificates. That's why I've been taking the (apparently | | somewhat

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-23 Thread Ian G
BTW, illustrating points made here, the cert is for financialcryptography.com but your link was to www.financialcryptography.com. So of course Firefox generated a warning Indeed and even if that gets fixed we still have to contend with: * the blog software can't handle the nature

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-21 Thread leichter_jerrold
| Imagine a E-commerce front end: Instead of little-guy.com buying a cert | which you are supposed to trust, they go to e-commerce.com and pay for a | link. Everyone trusts e-commerce.com and its cert. e-commerce provides a | guarantee of some sort to customers who go through it, and

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-18 Thread leichter_jerrold
| 2) the vast majority of e-commerce sites did very few number of | transactions each. this was the market segment involving e-commerce | sites that aren't widely known and/or represents first time business. it | is this market segment that is in the most need of trust establishment; | however, it

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-18 Thread Sidney Markowitz
On 12/19/05 9:54 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Imagine a E-commerce front end: Instead of little-guy.com buying a cert which you are supposed to trust, they go to e-commerce.com and pay for a link. Everyone trusts e-commerce.com and its cert. e-commerce provides a guarantee of some sort to