Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Ben Laurie
On Thu, Sep 15, 2011 at 6:40 AM, Kevin W. Wall kevin.w.w...@gmail.com wrote: [Note to moderator: May be slightly OT. Unfortunately, Gmail web interface won't allow me to alter the Subject: to mention it there.] [Note to gmail user: yes it will, Edit Subject right under the To box.

[cryptography] DigiNotar news

2011-09-15 Thread Kevin W. Wall
The DigiNotar breach made the IEEE Spectrum: http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/diginotar-certificate-authority-breach-crashes-egovernment-in-the-netherlands/?utm_source=techalertutm_medium=emailutm_campaign=091511 I only skimmed it and while I didn't see anything new, it is a

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Andy Steingruebl
On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 7:34 PM, Arshad Noor arshad.n...@strongauth.com wrote: However, an RP must assess this risk before trusting a self-signed Root CA's certificate.  If you believe there is uncertainty, then don't trust the Root CA.  Delete their certificate from your browser and other

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Ian G
On 15/09/2011, at 15:40, Kevin W. Wall kevin.w.w...@gmail.com wrote: Trust is not binary. Right. Or, in modelling terms, trust isn't absolute. AES might be 99.99% reliable, which is approximately 100% for any million or so events [1]. Trust in a CA might be more like 99%. Now, if we

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Ian G
On 16/09/2011, at 1:22, Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 7:34 PM, Arshad Noor arshad.n...@strongauth.com wrote: However, an RP must assess this risk before trusting a self-signed Root CA's certificate. If you believe there is uncertainty, then don't

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Marsh Ray
On 09/15/2011 12:15 PM, Ian G wrote: Trust in a CA might be more like 99%. Now, if we have a 1% untrustworthy rating for a CA, what happens when we have 100 CAs? Well, untrust is additive (at least). We require to trust all the CAs. So we have a 100% untrustworthy rating for any system of 100

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Ben Laurie
On Thu, Sep 15, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote: Zooko said something the other day that has really stuck with me. I can't get it out of my head, I hope he will give us a post to explain it further: https://twitter.com/zooko/status/108347877872500737 I find the word

Re: [cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread dan
Marsh Ray said this: -+-- | | Is this user's reliance dependency transitive? - Yes, obviously. | I agree with that. Can I ask if you agree with this? The source of risk is dependence, perhaps especially dependence on expectations of system state. Thinking aloud,

[cryptography] Let's go back to the beginning on this

2011-09-15 Thread Hird, Geoffrey R
I find the word trust confuses more than it communicates. Try Mark S. Miller's relies on instead! This reminds me... As many here will know, the DoD (Orange book, etc.) uses (or at least used to use) the word trust explicitly in this latter sense. Any component that handled multi-level data