Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-18 Thread ianG
On 18/08/13 09:11 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: If I chose to run Linux, I could fix the version I ran. In fact, I choose not to run it, so I don't need to. Indeed, or: That's terrible advice. Implement your own crypto of any sort widely leads to complete fail, as we see repeatedly. ;) gentle nud

[cryptography] enabling blind signatures in GPG

2013-08-18 Thread Jake
Hello everybody, I am trying to form an anonymous opining sytem based on a single Registrar, whose signatures deify users' public keys with the mark of a Participant. But to protect the users from an evil registrar, blinding must be used. I have been told that blinding is already implemente

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-18 Thread Ben Laurie
On 18 August 2013 02:55, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-08-18 4:11 PM, Ben Laurie wrote: > > > If I chose to run Linux, I could fix the version I ran. In fact, I choose > not to run it, so I don't need to. > > > But if you write software, you don't write it just for your own computer, > so if

Re: [cryptography] enabling blind signatures in GPG

2013-08-18 Thread Steve Weis
Hi Jake. This is not GPG-related, but I worked on an OpenID-based private federated login system called PseudoID that used blind signatures. Basically, an identity provider will check your real identity, then issue you a blindly-signed token which you can then later use to log in pseudo-anonymously

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-18 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 12:48:12PM -0400, Sandy Harris wrote: > On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Aaron Toponce > wrote: > > The /dev/urandom device in the Linux kernel uses the Yarrow pseudo random > > number generator when the entropy pool has been exhausted. > > No, it doesn't, or at least di

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-18 Thread Aaron Toponce
On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 12:24:45AM -, D. J. Bernstein wrote: > I'm not saying that /dev/urandom has a perfect API. It's disappointingly > common for vendors to deploy devices where the randomness pool has never > been initialized; BSD /dev/urandom catches this configuration bug by > blocking, b

[cryptography] rfc 4345 (arcfour) weakness

2013-08-18 Thread aortega
Hi list, Anyone know some paper or article citing vulnerabilities on the rfc 4345 version of RC4? I know of the article "A New Weakness in the RC4 Keystream Generator and an Approach to Improve the Security of the Cipher" by Paul and Preneel, that discovered a bias after the first 1536 first byte

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

2013-08-18 Thread coderman
On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 10:14 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: > ... my advice is that you probably should not run Linux if you need > strong randomness. i am surprised this has not surfaced more often in this thread: if you need good entropy: use a hardware entropy generator! also use a userspace entro