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On 2013-09-14 08:53, Peter Fairbrother wrote:
> I get that 1024 bits is about on the edge, about equivalent to 80
> bits or a little less, and may be crackable either now or sometime
> soon.
Moti Young and others wrote a book back in the 90's (or per
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On 18/09/13 18:56, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Sorry, mis-send... I meant:
>
> A quick glance at Briar makes it looks like it already uses local
> storage:
>
> """ Neither endpoint can send more than 2^32 connections to the
> other during a given rotation
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
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> On 18/09/13 17:27, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> Hmm, I would've thought clocks are *less* reliable than storage on
>> most devices.
>
> That may be true, but this isn't a choice between relying
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
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> On 18/09/13 17:27, Trevor Perrin wrote:
>> Hmm, I would've thought clocks are *less* reliable than storage on
>> most devices.
>
> That may be true, but this isn't a choice between relying
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On 18/09/13 17:27, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Hmm, I would've thought clocks are *less* reliable than storage on
> most devices.
That may be true, but this isn't a choice between relying on the clock
or relying on storage. It's a choice between relying on
- Forwarded message from Steve Weis -
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 08:50:09 -0700
From: Steve Weis
To: "liberationt...@lists.stanford.edu"
Subject: [liberationtech] "Ibis: An Overlay Mix Network for Microblogging" by
Ian Goldberg
Reply-To: liberationtech
Ian Goldberg is speaking about "Ibi
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 12:12 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> Thats a good approach but note it does assume your messages are delivered in
> the same order they are sent (even though they are delivered
> asynchronously). That is generally the case but does not have to be -
> neither email nor UDP for exam
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 7:35 AM, Michael Rogers
wrote:
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> On 18/09/13 08:12, Adam Back wrote:
>> Or better the actual key used could be derived to fix that. eg
>> k_{i+1}=H(k_i) delete k_i; but also sk_i=H(1||k_i) then use sk_i
>> values. In tha
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On 18/09/13 08:23, ianG wrote:
> If I compromise your first shared secret, does that mean every
> shared secret thereafter is compromised?
Yes. (Improvements are possible here, by sending and acking fresh key
material inside the encrypted envelopes, b
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On 18/09/13 08:12, Adam Back wrote:
> Or better the actual key used could be derived to fix that. eg
> k_{i+1}=H(k_i) delete k_i; but also sk_i=H(1||k_i) then use sk_i
> values. In that way you can keep keys for a gap with no security
> implicatio
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On 18/09/13 00:14, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> Why not have separate symmetric keys for each direction of
> communication (Alice -> Bob, Bob->Alice).
We derive separate keys for each direction from the shared secret.
> Then whenever a party encrypts or d
On 18/09/13 00:01 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
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Hi Marco,
This is a problem we're working on as part of the Briar project. Our
approach is pretty simple: establish a shared secret when you first
communicate, periodically run that secret through a one-wa
Thats a good approach but note it does assume your messages are delivered in
the same order they are sent (even though they are delivered
asynchronously). That is generally the case but does not have to be -
neither email nor UDP for example guarantee that.
Maybe you would want to include an
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