Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-24 Thread Trevor Perrin
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 4:51 AM, Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Thanks Trevor and Adam for your comments on this - I take your point about the importance of forward secrecy for metadata, so I'll abandon the idea of using

Re: [cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)

2013-09-24 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 24/09/13 00:18, Adam Back wrote: On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 01:39:35PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: Apple came within a whisker of solving the problem in iOS by creating an 'effaceable storage' area within the flash storage, which bypasses block

Re: [cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)

2013-09-24 Thread ianG
On 24/09/13 11:36 AM, Michael Rogers wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 24/09/13 00:18, Adam Back wrote: On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 01:39:35PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: Apple came within a whisker of solving the problem in iOS by creating an 'effaceable storage' area

[cryptography] Popular Deification of Transmission- and Crypto-Security

2013-09-24 Thread John Young
NSA Technical Journal published in October 1959 an article titled The Borders of Cryptology. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/borders_cryptology.pdf A chart shows three main topics with subdivisions of each: Electronic Warfare Cryptology SIGINT

[cryptography] Dissentr: A High-Latency Overlay Mix Network

2013-09-24 Thread Eugen Leitl
https://github.com/ShaneWilton/dissentr Note: This project was created as part of a 36-hour hackathon - and primarily as a proof of concept. While the ideas may be sound, and the prototype may work as designed, the protocols involved in this specific project have not been peer-reviewed, and

Re: [cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)

2013-09-24 Thread Nico Williams
On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 12:03:12AM +0200, Adam Back wrote: [In response to the idea of using encrypted file hashes as part of the key wrapping procedure...] Thats not bad (make the decryption dependant on accessibility of the entire file) nice as a design idea. But that could be expensive in