On 2013-11-13 16:14, realcr wrote:
2. Can I actually trust the elliptic curve with weil pairing to do its
cryptographic job? Maybe better asked: Can I trust it like I trust that
it is hard to factor numbers? (Maybe even more?)
The Weil pairing is a great big hole in our usual arguments that mos
On 2013-11-13 16:14, realcr wrote:
From what I understand, the group I'm looking for is an elliptic cure
with a weil pairing. (Jonathan mentioned bilinear map, I assume that
means the same thing?)
A pairing is a bilinear map. The Weil pairing is a particular bilinear
map on the points of cer
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Something of a noob question, but what about random.org? Is there some
reason why this site isn't used by the cryptographically wise? It
seems that they already offer public entropy, and from a very good
source. Sure you still can't use it for keys, bu
Because there's no guarantees at all for anything at all for that site.
On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Joshua Kingsolver Price
wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Something of a noob question, but what about random.org? Is there some
> reason why this site isn't used by
If you haven't heard, the IETF is trying to move forward with "HTTP 2.0", which
is, from what I can tell, simply "HTTPS all the time".
We know HTTPS is broken and that it gives people a false sense of security,
leading them to share material that they otherwise might not share, with
potentially
Some sanity appears:
On Nov 13, 2013, at 1:57 PM, Mike Bishop wrote:
> While the language may be strong, I agree with the sentiment that they are
> distinct mechanisms. Mark has proposed a mechanism, independent of HTTP/2.0,
> which can be used to migrate from an HTTP connection to an HTTPS c
On Nov 13, 2013, at 10:40 AM, Greg wrote:
> If you haven't heard, the IETF is trying to move forward with "HTTP 2.0",
> which is, from what I can tell, simply "HTTPS all the time".
The latter is a mis-characterization. If you read the WG's mailing list, you
will see that there are a variety of
-- Forwarded message --
From: Stephen Farrell
Date: Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 5:05 PM
Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Non-WG Mailing List: dsfjdssdfsd
To: "\"s...@ietf.org\" per" , perpass
, "c...@irtf.org" , "sec...@ietf.org"
Cc: Apps Discuss
Hi,
There was some discussion in Vancouver a
Hi All,
Is anyone aware of a blacklist that includes those 150 million records
from Adobe's latest breach?
I tried finding a list and was not successful. Bonus points if
implemented as a bloom filter (I'm interested in seeing how small that
list can be in practice, and I'd like to use it for its
On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 9:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> Is anyone aware of a blacklist that includes those 150 million records
> from Adobe's latest breach?
>
This is the only thing I've seen (haven't really looked):
http://stricture-group.com/files/adobe-top100.txt
> I tried findin
Take a look at http://dazzlepod.com/uniqpass/
Previously, I’m just kept that file as is, and did a case-insentive binary
search directly on disk… took maybe 10 seeks ~ 1ms to see if something was
present or not and could be done via command line. No index required, no
loading required. I’m
> Is anyone aware of a blacklist that includes those 150 million records
> from Adobe's latest breach?
>
> I tried finding a list and was not successful. Bonus points if
> implemented as a bloom filter (I'm interested in seeing how small that
> list can be in practice, and I'd like to use it for
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