On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 at 6:25 PM, ITechGeek wrote:
> So does this mean Iran & the like can stop hacking CAs and buy their own
> Geotrust cert to MITM their population?
>
Yeah, its been around for a while. What's surprising is (or maybe not)
is the CA is still not constraining the organizations even
>From a business persons standpoint I can see why they might not use that
technical control. They look at it as companies will use whatever they
want for their intranets (same reason we have new TLDs resolving as
127.0.53.53). And like most places I'm going to guess that money takes
priority over
I think that press release is years old. GeoTrust was bought by VeriSign
years ago who was then bought by Symantec.
This kind of agreement now requires the subordinate to be audited to the
same standards as all other public CAs.
On Apr 5, 2015 3:03 PM, "Jeffrey Walton" wrote:
>
> http://www.prn
Good catch - it would seem 10 years old to be exact:
http://www.hostreview.com/news/050215geotrust.html
On Mon, Apr 6, 2015 at 10:30 AM, Peter Bowen wrote:
> I think that press release is years old. GeoTrust was bought by VeriSign
> years ago who was then bought by Symantec.
>
> This kind of agr
In article
you write:
>http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/geotrust-launches-georoot-allows-organizations-with-their-own-certificate-authority-ca-to-chain-to-geotrusts-ubiquitous-public-root-54048807.html
Ten seconds of Googlage reveals that this press release is from
February 2005, over a d
Hi ! Which lightweight algorithms are vulnerable against slide attack?
Specifically, can we use the slide attack to Tiny encryption algorithm(TEA)
or PRESENT?
Thanks already for all responses .
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Nope.
Slide attack and reflection attacks are only possible if there's a certain
symmetry in the key schedule. TEA has a lousy key schedule, but it is not
symmetrical. Neither is PRESENT.
Question: if I were to see the ciphertext being processed under a slide
attack, what would it look like? A sh
