-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I am wondering if it is okay to use the same asymmetric ECC key for
ECDSA and ECIES. Given that the signing and encryption algorithms are
not related like in RSA, I assume it is okay to use the same key for
both operations.
Are there any things I
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 20.09.2013 17:17, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
It is technically secure. See:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615
Thanks you so much for this paper, it's even mostly understandable
with some basic knowledge of attack models :)
Even so, I would not
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 20.09.2013 22:09, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
Crypto++ has the schemes and Dr. Bernstein's curve. The library is
available on all major Linux and BSD platforms.
I am using Crypto++ already, but I can't find ed25519 anywhere in the
library. FYI: The
They have implemented ZRTP for end to end security. It works with a
diffie hellman key exchange, while protecting against man-in-the-middle
attackers by comparing Short Authentication Strings (SAS). When you know
the voice of the other person you can exclude Eve.
see
commit (e.g. send H(N,g^x)) prior to
sending their g^x to avoid the latter problem? If so, then what's
the use of the SAS?
Sorry if all those questions are trivial...
Wasa
On 23/05/2013 19:05, Dominik Schürmann wrote:
They have implemented ZRTP for end to end security. It works
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hi folks,
we recently wrote a small section about skype with some references:
http://sufficientlysecure.org/uploads/skype.pdf
Interesting references (from 2005, 2006):
http://www.ossir.org/windows/supports/2005/2005-11-07/EADS-CCR_Fabrice_Skype.pdf
