Re: [cryptography] key management guidelines

2010-09-04 Thread Morlock Elloi
The basic fallacy here is the assumption that some magical 'identity' exists and all we have to do is be brilliant enough to figure it out. It doesn't. It's just a collection of beneficial behaviors, a Nash equilibrium that changes as the rules of the Game change (which, by definition, exists :

Re: [cryptography] philosophical question about strengths and attacks at impossible levels

2010-10-14 Thread Morlock Elloi
It's because cryptographers don't really have more imagination than, say, TV screen OEMs: bigger is better, simply because they don't know to do anything else. It doesn't matter that there is no bandwidth to fill that screen, that there is really no content worth watching, that the effective ang

Re: [cryptography] Digital cash in the news...

2011-06-11 Thread Morlock Elloi
BitCoin has only one problem: maintenance of the relationship between unit BitCoin value and the material world (energy, as in KWh) is 'soft', it requires some sort of a volatile communal effort, which sets it for failure (as a counter example, the amount of Au atoms on this planet is rather ind

Re: [cryptography] -currently available- crypto cards with onboard key storage

2011-10-28 Thread Morlock Elloi
Take a cheap Android, write the code you need for it, make it talk via USB, rip out all antennas, put it in your box (wrap in a paper bag first), and connect with USB cable to the internal USB port. HW cost: $80 > a Trojan. Security certification concerns put aside, the > architectural demands

Re: [cryptography] Duplicate primes in lots of RSA moduli

2012-02-16 Thread Morlock Elloi
Properly designed rngs should refuse to supply bits that have less than specified (nominal) entropy. The requestor can go away or wait. In many applications it is sufficient to postpone key generation until the last possible moment (for some odd reason, coders tend to generate keys first, then

Re: [cryptography] Questions about crypto in Oracle TDE

2012-11-08 Thread Morlock Elloi
We have been using a different approach for securing particular fields in the database. The main issue with symmetric ciphers inside (distributed) systems is that the encrypting entity is always the most numerous weak point. Whoever subverts your input flow - and there are lots of opportunities

Re: [cryptography] Questions about crypto in Oracle TDE

2012-11-09 Thread Morlock Elloi
As long as each encryption of the same plaintext yields the same ciphertext, indexing works. However, the space is tight - plaintext size is close to the cipher capacity. BTW, the same plaintext is never encrypted with different keys, so CRT doesn't work. > Do you do any padding?  If not you

Re: [cryptography] Questions about crypto in Oracle TDE

2012-11-09 Thread Morlock Elloi
There is some space. But this is not the usual PK situation where 256-bit secret key is stuffed in 2000+ bit space. Few notes: - Data integrity/authenticity was not the objective. Only secrecy. - Obtaining 'public' key means subverting and reverse engineering the application input modules, an

Re: [cryptography] How much does it cost to start a root CA ?

2013-01-04 Thread Morlock Elloi
Correct. The cost of being CA is equal to the cost of getting CA signing pub key into the target audience browsers. You can (sorted by increasing security, starting with zero): 1 - go through browser vendors, 2 - have your users to install additional CA key into their existing browsers (and pe