Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing

- Sent from my phone Den 5 apr. 2016 09:17 skrev "John Gilmore" : > > > The key idea here is that you get to have *one* identifier for yourself > > under your control, that you can use everywhere, securely. > > The key idea here is a bad idea. > > I don't want everyone I interact with to have the s

Re: [cryptography] [Endymail] Secure universal message addressing

Den 4 apr. 2016 19:23 skrev "Sean Leonard" : > > I think it’s called a URI. > > Any “universal” address is going to have to have embedded info about the protocol or system that it is addressing. See URI. People see URL:s and think websites, they see email addresses and think people. OpenID essent

[cryptography] Secure universal message addressing

I'm crossposting this to a few lists, a few of the relevant mail archives are here for those who want to follow the replies on the other lists; http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/ http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/ http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/endymail/current/m

Re: [cryptography] Fwd: The Wandering Music Band

Den 10 dec 2015 21:02 skrev "realcr" : > > It has been a while, but I think I know now about an idea to solve this problem. > I really appreciate all the help I got from your responses. > > I wrote a document that explains it here: > > https://www.newtolife.net/the-trusted-supernode-and-distributed

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Feedback requested: ECC anonymous signatures with per-message revocable anonymity and pair-wise message linkability

@Richard Clayton: I'm aware of Fawkes signatures. They are somewhat applicable, but in some circumstances they aren't useful and/or safe. Here's the best case stateless implementation of Fawkes signatures that I can see that matches this usecase; Use a seed and a counter to derive commitment valu

[cryptography] Feedback requested: ECC anonymous signatures with per-message revocable anonymity and pair-wise message linkability

This started with the following Reddit thread: http://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/32gh1v/looking_for_signing_algorithm_that_keeps_signee/ The goal is to be able to publish signed messages anonymously and then later on prove it was you who signed them, at a time of your choosing. NOTE: I'm no

Re: [cryptography] Do quantum attacks/algos also lead to compromise of PFS?

Den 24 jan 2015 22:06 skrev "Greg" : > > So, I understand that QM algos can pretty much dismantle all popular asymmetric encryption algos with enough q-bits, but I haven't thought hard enough to see if they also can be used to compromise communications that used DH to do PFS underneath the initial

Re: [cryptography] The Wandering Music Band

Den 8 jan 2015 13:00 skrev "realcr" : >> >> You still don't get any meaningful security if old band members are assumed to be untrusted and you don't use a public checkpointing mechanism. Transfer of the title of being the real group must be a one-time only thing for each version of the group, and

Re: [cryptography] The Wandering Music Band

Den 8 jan 2015 11:54 skrev "realcr" : > > Hey, thanks again for the reply. >> >> The only notable difference is that in my version you are checkpointing the change in th blockchain. >> >> You still have the very same form of signing, but you sign a slightly different message (transfer of a colored

Re: [cryptography] The Wandering Music Band

Den 8 jan 2015 08:03 skrev "realcr" : > > Hey Natanael, Thanks for your response. > >> >> It's the chain of signatures always published in an accessible way so that the original members can't "doublespend" and claim to be the task group? Otherwise

Re: [cryptography] The Wandering Music Band

Den 7 jan 2015 22:14 skrev "realcr" : > > Hey, > Thank you for all the responses. I figured out that I left some important details out, probably because I thought about it for a long time. I'm sorry about that. > I will try to formulate it again: > > Assume that the world contains correct people (P

Re: [cryptography] Complete repository of known playing card ciphers

Den 10 sep 2014 22:34 skrev "Aaron Toponce" : > > I've since put together a site of playing card ciphers, weak and strong. It's > still _very_ much a work in progress, but some input would be appreciated: > > http://aarontoponce.org/card-ciphers/ [...] > I still have a great amount of work to

Re: [cryptography] Weak random data XOR good enough random data = better random data?

Den 28 jul 2014 18:23 skrev "Lodewijk andré de la porte" : > > Hey everyone, > > If I XOR probably random data with good enough random data, does that result in at least good enough random data? > > I'm working on some Javascript client side crypto. There's a cryptographic quality random generator

Re: [cryptography] WG Review: TCP Increased Security (tcpinc)

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 7:35 PM, ianG wrote: > Original Message > Subject: [Tcpcrypt] WG Review: TCP Increased Security (tcpinc) > Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 14:31:12 -0700 > From: The IESG > To: IETF-Announce > CC: tcpinc WG > > A new IETF working group has been proposed in the T

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Help investigate cell phone snooping by police nationwide

Den 8 jun 2014 21:52 skrev "Jerry Leichter" : > > On Jun 7, 2014, at 7:56 PM, Bill Cox wrote: >>> >>> Is there reliable evidence that putting mobiles in a fridge is any >>> better illusory comsec than putting pillows around the door also >>> comically exhibited to clueless journalists favored by S

Re: [cryptography] First public DNSChain server went online yesterday!

Den 9 feb 2014 00:53 skrev "Eric Mill" : > > On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 4:38 PM, Natanael wrote: >> >> 1: Domains expire unless renewed. > > I did not understand that about Namecoin at all, that is A+. >> >> 3: The security model of blockchain based syste

Re: [cryptography] First public DNSChain server went online yesterday!

1: Domains expire unless renewed. 2: Transfers are possible. 3: The security model of blockchain based systems like Namecoin is that the primary chain had the greatest amount of proof-of-work behind it, and you can't fake the proof-of-work. You can try to isolate a node and provide a fake chain,

Re: [cryptography] Techniques for protecting CA Root certificate Secret Key

Den 9 jan 2014 00:56 skrev "Paul F Fraser" : > > Software and physical safe keeping of Root CA secret key are central to security of a large set of issued certificates. > Are there any safe techniques for handling this problem taking into account the need to not have the control in the hands of one

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Timing Correlation Attacks on XMPP chats?

Den 5 jan 2014 13:23 skrev "Randolph" : > > Hi > > - a "scrambler" could send out from time to time fake messages. > - an "impersonator" could record your own chat behaviour and generate random time and lenght and content data, so it looks like your own chat > - the main problem remains that from a

Re: [cryptography] pie in sky suites - long lived public key pairs for persistent identity

Den 3 jan 2014 20:42 skrev "coderman" : > > use case is long term (decade+) identity rather than privacy or > session authorization. > > eternity key signs working keys tuned for speed with limited secret > life span (month+). working keys are used for secret exchange and any > other temporal purp

Re: [cryptography] Can we move to a forum, please?

To those asking for a decentralized and anonymous solution - there is Syndie on I2P, but I doubt that anyone here will like the interface or the excessive slowness of the entire thing. Fetching lists of conversations can take hours, and you don't really know if posts are missing or not. Then there

Re: [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution

need to distinguish between them anymore. A 'light' > messaging client could simply ignore the non transport email headers, > or use your standard msg@nodekey address. > Please do not continue to talk about antique tradional centralized > systems in this thread, except of course to b

Re: [cryptography] DNSNMC replaces Certificate Authorities with Namecoin and fixes HTTPS security

That sounds a lot like my Web of Trust based DNS suggestion. Link: http://www.reddit.com/r/Meshnet/comments/o3wex/wotdns_web_of_trust_based_domain_name_system Domain names would not be globally unique, where they go would instead be based on each individual node's trust ranking for the site's nod

Re: [cryptography] Mixing RdRand with other CPU-based entropy sources?

It's always a good idea to use several entropy sources and cryptographically mix their outputs into your pool. They won't reduce your total entropy either way, any predictable sources will only be adding less entropy than promised. - Sent from my phone Den 19 dec 2013 09:19 skrev "Joachim Strömber

Re: [cryptography] Security Discussion: Password Based Key Derivation for Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman key agreement

Sounds just like the Bitcoin blockchain to me. Or maybe the fork Namecoin. - Sent from my phone Den 18 dec 2013 02:20 skrev "James A. Donald" : > On 2013-12-18 04:38, Joseph Birr-Pixton wrote: > >> In very general terms, you cannot hope to achieve confidentiality >> without authenticity. >> >> Yo

Re: [cryptography] The next generation secure email solution

Bote mail and I2P messenger are two pieces of serverless software that ALREADY is public key addressed within I2P. Have you tried them? You need to add the public keys of the recipients to be able to send a message to start with, although the DHT based search system Seedless allow you to publish Bo

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email is unsecurable

So, Convergence/Perspectives done on email headers? - Sent from my phone Den 27 nov 2013 22:07 skrev "Stephen Farrell" : > > > On 11/27/2013 09:01 PM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > > Isn't the key distribution problem being pushed into DNS? The > > underlying problem still exists. > > Depends. If say s

Re: [cryptography] Email is unsecurable

Bote mail doesn't have to be used for it's anonymous properties, for me that is just a bonus. For many people it is more than enough to be able to know that it is impossible for anybody else than the intended recipient to read the message thanks to public key addressing. Guaranteed end-to-end secur

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email is unsecurable

That can really only be solved by gateways, IMHO. It's the only way to talk between the systems that don't put limits on how secure either one can be. - Sent from my phone Den 26 nov 2013 16:09 skrev "c1cc10" : > If we're discussing about this topic it is because of people. emails are > one peopl

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email is unsecurable

ts to be done on > existing interoperable platforms. > > Let's first cut-off the massive passive traffic analysis, then improve > current systems to provide some added protection against metadata, > focusing in a far future, when the new system got already wide adoption, > make

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email is unsecurable

Say hello to Bote mail on I2P. I2P provides encrypted anonymizing networking, Bote mail provides DHT based serverless encrypted mailing with public crypto keys as addresses (ECDSA or NTRU). http://i2p2.de and i2pbote.i2p (if you don't have I2P installed, add .us to visit it via an inproxy). Ther

Re: [cryptography] NIST Randomness Beacon (andrew cooke) (and Andy Isaacson, et al.)

Because there's no guarantees at all for anything at all for that site. On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Joshua Kingsolver Price wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Something of a noob question, but what about random.org? Is there some > reason why this site isn't used by

Re: [cryptography] NIST Randomness Beacon

You can also submit a hash of the documents of the event to the Bitcoin blockchain in a transaction. There are so many who can confirm it was published at a certain date that it can't be practically faked. - Sent from my phone Den 12 nov 2013 00:30 skrev "Peter Gutmann" : > Warren Kumari writes:

Re: [cryptography] NIST Randomness Beacon

t; On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 8:14 PM, Natanael wrote: > > Proof-of-work, just like Bitcoin itself uses for hashing? > No this idea isn't about proof of work. The idea is delaying the > computation result, preventing a miner from picking a value. > If the computation takes an

Re: [cryptography] NIST Randomness Beacon

Proof-of-work, just like Bitcoin itself uses for hashing? See hashcash as well. Require that the message in question is hashed together with a random value, with an output that matches a given pattern. And specify that one part of the message has to be the hash of a Bitcoin block from the given tim

Re: [cryptography] [tahoe-dev] SNARKs, constant-time proofs of computation

SCIPR is another one. http://www.scipr-lab.org/ If it became efficient it could be useful for mining in a Bitcoin fork (commonly called altcoins). Don't know what kind of computations you'd actually would want it to do, though. Most meaningful computations could easily be deprecated by better algo

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin attack

Can't the distributed pool P2Pool easily be updated to account for that? - Sent from my phone Den 4 nov 2013 16:33 skrev "Peter Todd" : > On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 09:31:04AM -0430, Karn Kallio wrote: > > > > The paper "Majority is not Enough Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable" may be of > > interest. >

Re: [cryptography] coderman's keys

No hints at what kind of client it takes? Custom config or recompile? - Sent from my phone Den 1 nov 2013 05:11 skrev "coderman" : > On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:55 PM, coderman wrote: > > my contempt for email is well known and reinforced by choice of provider. > > > > there are myriad rebuttals t

Re: [cryptography] ciphersuite revocation model? (Re: the spell is broken)

Should we create some kind of CRL style protocol for algorithms? Then we'd have a bunch of servers run by various organizations specialized on crypto/computer security that can issue warnings against unsecure algorithms, as well as cipher modes and combinations of ciphers and whatever else it might

Re: [cryptography] One Time Pad Cryptanalysis

That would be known plaintext attack (or statistical analysis like how simple ciphers typically are broken) vs chosen plaintext attack (BREACH is the latter, while compression would increase "entropy density" to make the former harder since each individual bit becomes harder to predict). Sorry, no

Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet

Carrier-agnostic encrypted mesh routing software: CJDNS. Cantenna, IR-link based RONJA, ethernet/LAN, whatever. If you've got a data link you can use it. It creates an IPv6 network internally in the 'fc' range (private network) where the address is a hash of the node's public key. On Wed, Sep 25

Re: [cryptography] The Unbreakable Cipher

For your question: Session keys and key rotation? Den 25 sep 2013 16:11 skrev "John Young" : > NSA Technical Journal published "The Unbreakable Cipher" in Spring 1961. > > http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/The_Unbreakable_Cipher.pdf > > Excerpts: > > [Quote] > > David Kahn, "Lye

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

I made a suggestion like this elsewhere: Store the keys split up in several different files using Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme. Encrypt each file with a different key. Encrypt those keys with a master key. XOR each encrypted key with the SHA256 of their respective encrypted files. Put those XORe

Re: [cryptography] Compositing Ciphers?

http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/02/multiple-encryption.html Apparently it's called "cascade encryption" or "cascade encipherment", and the implementations are apparently called "robust combiners". And by the way, Truecrypt already lets you pick your chosen combo of AES and two other ci

Re: [cryptography] Authenticated Time Synchronization

If the server isn't trusted enough to be allowed to know how many devices there are behind one proxy/IP address, then cookies should never be reused, otherwise it might be able to tell that there's simultaneously maybe 5 or so different cookies being used when sending time requests from the same IP

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

Considering that it's designed to not trust the servers in the first place (just your gateway, which often will be part of your own client or otherwise run locally), it's not all too hard. If you've verified the client, then you can be sure your data is secure. 2013/8/29 Nikos Fotiou : > A naive c

Re: [cryptography] NSA cracking UN videoconference - worried?

Elsewhere it has been speculated that they got access to the VPN they used. 2013/8/27 : > Dear Cryptographers, > > The article on "UN video-conference spying allegations" ( > http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/25/nsa-bugged-u-n-headquarters. > html ) claims: > > "In the summer of 2012,

Re: [cryptography] no-keyring public

Bitcoin Brainwallet software creates ECDSA keys that you can use for multiple purposes, not only for Bitcoin. A link to Phidelius, which was previously mentioned: http://dankaminsky.com/2012/01/03/phidelius/ --- I would like to see some standardized hierarchial deterministic scheme to generate v

Re: [cryptography] Reflection Attacks in Challenge/Response Protocols

The client and the server shouldn't both generate responses exactly the same way with the same key, no. If you use HMAC, I think including a simple identifier would be good enough. Something like this: HMAC(key, device ID + counter + timestamp), where the server and client has different IDs. Den 2

Re: [cryptography] Jingle and Otr

-- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 8/20/13 8:31 PM, Natanael wrote: > > https://jitsi.org/Documentation/ZrtpFAQ > > "ZRTP and the GNU ZRTP implementation provide features to > communication programs to setup of secure audio and video session > without additional infrastructure, s

Re: [cryptography] Jingle and Otr

https://jitsi.org/Documentation/ZrtpFAQ "ZRTP and the GNU ZRTP implementation provide features to communication programs to setup of secure audio and video session without additional infrastructure, server programs, registration, and alike." While this doesn't state outright that Jitsi uses ZRTP

Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random

Most regular people can't accurately test or evaluate the output. Numbers aren't random, the sources are. You can't just judge a PRNG by it's output. For all you know the PRNG could be doing nothing more than doing SHA256 of a fixed value plus a counter, and if somebody would know that fixed value

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

That's trademarks, not copyright, and they get it transfered IF they request it and the original owner did not have a valid reason to use that domain with the trademarked name/phrase. And either way, reusing previously malicious domains for legit purposes is probably THE WORST method ever of accid

Re: [cryptography] [ramble] [tldr] Layered security where encryption is used?

Big fat disclaimer: I'm also not a crypto expert. Don't trust this without verification from somebody who is. To add to what CodesInChaos said, just in case you can't use different keys for different types of data then just before encrypting it you could add a HMAC of the plaintext with a tag (sho

Re: [cryptography] A secret sharing consensus protocol (or leader election protocol)

You might find my suggested scheme interesting: http://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/r003r/are_others_interested_in_cryptographybased_voting/c42lo83 It uses Secure Multiparty Computing plus Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme among a number of nodes with conflicting interests (in order to avoid col

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

Convergence, (in-browser) certificate pinning, and a few more. You could also use DNSSEC to serve the certificate. 2013/6/30 James A. Donald > The biggest Tor vulnerability is that governments and large criminal > organizations (but I repeat myself) can use their influence over a CA to > perfor

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

rather than for live chat (IM or IRC) or continous browsing. 2013/6/30 Jacob Appelbaum > Natanael: > > I'm not seeing that many options though. The Phantom project died pretty > > fast; > > https://code.google.com/p/phantom/ > > https://groups.google.c

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

dy*? Could we try to start a new project (if needed) to create one? (I would like one with at least the same level of functionality as I2P, even if it would have to have a very different architecture.) 2013/6/30 Jacob Appelbaum > Natanael: > > I would like to point out that th

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

I would like to point out that the developers of the anonymizing network I2P are looking for more external review of the codebase (it's in Java, by the way). Everybody who knows how to do security reviews of source code and has time to spare should take a look at it. FYI, I also think that I2P's s

Re: [cryptography] Snowden: Fabricating Digital Keys?

That depends on the system. Consider how HDCP encryption was broken; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-bandwidth_Digital_Content_Protection It used a scheme where access to enough keys allowed you to calculate the master key, breaking the entire scheme. 2013/6/25 Bill Scannell > This Daily B

Re: [cryptography] 100 Gbps line rate encryption

Would anybody dare to use a SHA256 based stream cipher? (XOR with checksum of key and counter or whatever you want to throw in there.) Would it be faster than RC4/Salsa20? I'm a bit curious about why nobody seems to be using hash/checksum based stream ciphers. 2013/6/23 James A. Donald > On 20

Re: [cryptography] Project C-43 and Public Key Encryption

Isn't that equivalent to sender doing XOR on the plaintext, recipient doing XOR on first ciphertext, sender doing another XOR on second ciphertext to create third ciphertext, and the recipient doing XOR again to get plaintext? That's key-reuse and breaks XOR/OTP. The middleman simply XORs the ciph

Re: [cryptography] Looking for earlier proof: no secure channel without previous secure channel

So basically, the way around having one insecure channel is to use so many insecure channels that the same attacker can't control them all. Which IRL means you run around between computers and check if what you published is available under the exact identity/keys you specified, and keep making up n

Re: [cryptography] Looking for earlier proof: no secure channel without previous secure channel

My suggestion is that you research the history of (cryptographic) authentication, mutual authentication (thanks Wikipedia for that phrase) and MITM. (Maybe you already have done that, though?) I can at least point out that spy agencies have known for many many decades that you can not securely and

Re: [cryptography] A new (hopefully silly) Zerocoin/accumulator question

>From what I have read, and as far as I have understood it, your zero-knowledge proofs are linked to a specific "state" of your choice. In other words, you prove that your Zerocoin mint was one of a certain set of Zerocoin mints. One can ONLY test the zero-knowledge proof against that set (since yo

Re: [cryptography] NSA Releases 136 Cryptologs 1974-1997

The OCR file link is wrong. Ditch that "e" in "text". http://cryptome.org/2013/03/nsa-cryptologs-txt.zip 2013/3/20 John Young > Most of the Cryptologs were formerly classified Top Secret. > NSA calls it a "monumental release." > > Non-searchable image files at NSA: > > http://www.nsa.gov/public

Re: [cryptography] Bitmessage

This is precisely how I2P eepsites work. The true addresses are [52 characters of b32 encoded checksum of public key].b32.i2p while the hosts.txt file is a list of these with their readable [sitename].i2p domains. You can modify your own lists as you wish. I2P Messenger and Bote mail could be comb

Re: [cryptography] Bonding or Insuring of CAs?

mselves does, I personally don't think as many people would be interested in the discussions. But then I don't have any data on that, and I don't know how many or what kind of responses you got. 2013/1/26 Paul Hoffman > On Jan 25, 2013, at 4:11 PM, Natanael wrote: > >

Re: [cryptography] Bonding or Insuring of CAs?

On topic for the thread: I don't *think* there's currently any insurance companies with special policies for CA:s. There might be about 600 organizations that can issue SSL certs according to EFF, but there's more insurance companies than that in the world. Most of them probably don't have many CA:

Re: [cryptography] University of Waterloo's Quantum Cryptography School for Young Students

However, quantum cryptography adds so many more requirements that it has almost no benefits at all compared to what we have already. Den 8 jan 2013 00:19 skrev : > > There is already too much hype over QKD. It's "unbreakable" (if you pay > > no attention to all those vulnerabilities at the physic

Re: [cryptography] How much does it cost to start a root CA ?

Bitcoin based DNS? That would be Namecoin. I am unsure if it also manages SSL or similiar link encryption or if that is a separate thing for the scheme. Den 6 jan 2013 08:27 skrev "James A. Donald" : > On 2013-01-05 12:07 PM, Morlock Elloi wrote: > >> Correct. The cost of being CA is equal to the

Re: [cryptography] Your GPU's ???Fingerprint??? Could Lead to New Security Methods

*Rootkits*. Just replace the firmware. Den 30 okt 2012 19:13 skrev "Jonas Wielicki" : > On 30.10.2012 14:30, Natanael wrote: > > Yeah, this looks like TPM with software protection instead of hardware > > protection. > > > > Rootkits can screw it up. &g

Re: [cryptography] Your GPU's ???Fingerprint??? Could Lead to New Security Methods

Yeah, this looks like TPM with software protection instead of hardware protection. Rootkits can screw it up. Den 30 okt 2012 14:27 skrev "Solar Designer" : > This is very curious, but ... > > On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 10:08:06AM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > Cloning the actual SRAM state in a GPU i

Re: [cryptography] cjdns review

AFAIK the key is just generated once and then hashes are generated in two rounds, if it is 0xFC at the first try it's done, otherwise it runs more checksum rounds in groups of two. Den 4 okt 2012 22:55 skrev "Guus Sliepen" : > On Thu, Oct 04, 2012 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > I've

Re: [cryptography] A new form of encryption allows you to compute with data you cannot read

Homomorphic encryption isn't really that new, it's just that it's starting to get practical first now. On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:49 PM, Moti wrote: > > http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/num2/2012/5/alice-and-bob-in-cipherspace/1 > > ___ > crypto

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

In that case Anonymous and other hacker groups is your problem. Den 23 sep 2012 01:37 skrev "StealthMonger" : > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > Natanael writes: > > > I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tappe

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

I can not imagine anything inherently trustable. I do not want to trust that single server won't be hacked, tapped by NSA or raided by FBI. Den 22 sep 2012 22:49 skrev "StealthMonger" : > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > "James A. Donald" writes: > > > On 2012-09-05 11:51 PM, S

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

In this case I definitely prefer my version that requires no activity at all of this kind, unless somebody manages to hack a majority of the servers you hired. None need at all to move something continuously, just wipe enough of your servers so that the threshold can't be reached by the hacker. The

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

his thing? Remember that the overhead makes it slooow, so no secret bruteforcing of anything. - Sent from my tablet Den 5 sep 2012 16:21 skrev "Natanael" : > If the trustee (correct word?) stops passing the messages to your "CDMS" > (cryptographic dead man switch), it wo

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

But you can't revoke his ability to keep bruteforcing the message. - Sent from my tablet Den 19 sep 2012 23:01 skrev "mhey...@gmail.com" : > Doh, don't know why I brought public-key crypto into this. There isn't > a need for it. Just pick, say, an AES key and give the trustee some of > the key's

Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution

It can detect passive snooping, not full MITM. - Sent from my tablet Den 18 sep 2012 18:17 skrev "Zack Weinberg" : > On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Natanael wrote: > > Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not > > see any benefit over

Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution

Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and knows it's not MitM'd in advance, what advantage if any does quantum key distribution have over ordinary methods? And isn't it just as useless otherwis

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

ion to become known. Unless you find some way to reverse that or use > a hybrid crypto and non-crypto solution a DMS cannot happen. > > Anyone disagree? > > Note that a Bitcoin-like/distributed network could in potential be an > automated DMS-crypto-cheat. > > 2012/9/5 Natanael

Re: [cryptography] Can there be a cryptographic "dead man switch"?

If the trustee (correct word?) stops passing the messages to your "CDMS" (cryptographic dead man switch), it would simply decrypt the original message automatically. So you can not put the entire mechanism in the hands of the trustee, especially not the part that authorizes the decryption. I could

Re: [cryptography] How to safely produce web pages from multiple sources?

Isn't the standard answer to always verify, verify, verify? Make sure you only accept some types of data from Malloc and verify it *can't* do strange crap. Also, read up on XSS prevention and all that. BTW, it doesn't have to be done in the browser. You can do it server side, although it will incr

Re: [cryptography] encrypted bloom filter protocols with unlinkable queries

Never trust that the server delete data. - Sent from my tablet Den 21 jul 2012 11:15 skrev : > Hello, I have a question regarding encrypted bloom filter protocols. I > have come to the understanding that I can use such protocols to allow a > client to query a server for the presence of a string,

Re: [cryptography] non-decryptable encryption

or & colleague i knew, before submission. easy to err on this > things. > > --- jd.cypherpu...@gmail.com wrote: > > From: "jd.cypherpunks" > To: "givo...@37.com" > Cc: Natanael , "cryptography@randombit.net" < > cryptography@random

Re: [cryptography] non-decryptable encryption

but, good > enough for most ppl. I stand by phil zimmerman's point. most ppl use > envelopes. easily opened. but a good deterent. > > --- natanae...@gmail.com wrote: > > From: Natanael > To: givo...@37.com > Cc: cryptography@randombit.net, jam...@echeque.com >

Re: [cryptography] non-decryptable encryption

What I think people react on is that it's really pointless to use decimals and having to keep track of when they repeat. A simple RNG with normal numbers could be used instead, and probably *should* be used unless your crypto really *needs* numbers consisting of primes divided by primes. So essent

Re: [cryptography] non-decryptable encryption

I'm not a crypto expert, but I have read a bit about it, and have some comments. I am pretty sure that my comments below are accurate and relevant. Feel free to correct me if I am wrong. One: On the second paper, you assume a prime number as long as the message is secure, and give an example of a

Re: [cryptography] This Link Will Self Destruct

Looks like that only would be useful when you can't protect the link's resource itself with authentication requirements, and I can only see it as being useful when assuming a passive attacker who aren't trying to access the link before the intended recipient. I would even consider encrypting the li

Re: [cryptography] Forensic snoops: It doesn't take a Genius to break into an iPhone

Just FYI, there's been claims that these guys faked it. But on the other hand, there ARE other tools that can extract data from iPhones so you can bruteforce the encryption later. I might look for the links later. Sent from my tablet Den 10 apr 2012 19:07 skrev "Randall Webmail" : > Cop tools ea

Re: [cryptography] crypto.cat

Again - SSL flaws, bad server, etc... Maybe a buggy browser. Can you imagine a bug allowing JS injection in any tab? Post a bit.ly link and wait for keys... Bugs like that have existed before. 2012-04-01 02:54 skrev James A. Donald: On 2012-04-01 7:51 AM, natanae...@gmail.com wrote: > It's run

Re: [cryptography] crypto.cat

It's running in a browser using JS... 2012-03-31 23:33 skrev Nadim: This strikes me as a sizeable assumption. NK On Saturday, 31 March, 2012 at 5:28 PM, natanae...@gmail.com wrote: And javascript controls how it is used. Modify or add some JS and you can take the key. 2012-03-31 22:56 skr

Re: [cryptography] crypto.cat

And javascript controls how it is used. Modify or add some JS and you can take the key. 2012-03-31 22:56 skrev James A. Donald: On 2012-04-01 6:17 AM, natanae...@gmail.com wrote: > There are two issues IMHO: > > * SSL flaws/Javascript MITM/bad servers. Your key can be leaked. According to the

Re: [cryptography] crypto.cat

There are two issues IMHO: * SSL flaws/Javascript MITM/bad servers. Your key can be leaked. * If you already have a way to verify fingerprint PER SESSION, then why use this service? I can only imagine it's because you prefer to type on a computer keyboard on a public access computer than on you

Re: [cryptography] crypto.cat

It seems to lack verification and authorization = easy to MITM. 2012-03-31 15:49 skrev Mario Contestabile: You guys have any cypherpunk opinions on https://crypto.cat/ ? It's a "secure" online communication tool, apparently used by Anonymous. It was developed by Nadim Kobeissi, (yet another

Re: [cryptography] Haystacks and Needles

Sounds good, but they're already asking for backdoors to the haystacks... 2012-03-27 17:45 skrev Ed Stone: Just as immunizations protect not only the person immunized, but also help protect the community from contagion, wouldn't more encrypted content have a public benefit through increasing t

Re: [cryptography] [OT] The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)

NSA flamebait? Hehe. On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 18:14, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 8:08 PM, Randall Webmail > wrote: > > From: "Jeffrey I. Schiller" > > > >>I bet everyone on this list can send encrypted messages to each other > >>and they will never be broken... because they

Re: [cryptography] Number of hash function preimages

He actually asked two different questions on #2, if all hashes have collisions and if all messages have collisions. For MD5, the latter is "almost" proven true. There's a tool that let you enter two plaintexts, and then it generates a shared appended string (like md5(text_a+string)=md5(text_b+st

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