[cryptography] Peer review request - Loplop

2012-11-16 Thread Uncle Zzzen
Hi. I need peer review for loplop https://github.com/thedod/loplop The code in question is 40 lines of python: https://github.com/thedod/loplop/blob/master/CLI/__init__.py It's a fork of the oplop stateless password manager http://code.google.com/p/oplop/ What I've changed was to allow for passwo

Re: [cryptography] Peer review request - Loplop

2012-11-16 Thread Uncle Zzzen
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 1:10 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:34 PM, Uncle Zzzen > wrote: > > Hi. > > I need peer review for loplop > > https://github.com/thedod/loplop > For the whole scheme, or just the change? The whole scheme (including the

Re: [cryptography] Peer review request - Loplop

2012-11-17 Thread Uncle Zzzen
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 9:51 AM, Kyle Creyts wrote: > giving it an extremely brief run-through, I'd say that you've made a > different compromise than the app-maker chose in making the limit 8. > > the choice of 8 base64 digits out of the 24 given by the md5 appears > to have been explicitly done

Re: [cryptography] Peer review request - Loplop

2012-11-19 Thread Uncle Zzzen
Thanks. The fact that MD5 is fast is indeed an issue I've overlooked (although I understand this issue falls under "ugly but not too dangerous", I think the exploding tire example at crypto.se conveys how ugly it is). The problem is that I'm specifically looking for a reasonably-secure backward c

Re: [cryptography] Gmail and SSL

2012-12-17 Thread Uncle Zzzen
I don't understand much about CAs, but I know what paypal does: you paste your public key (while being logged in via ssl, of course) and THEY sign it for you. They also show you a "key id" string (don't remember exact name) that you should include inside the encrypted request (probably against a ca